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This dissertation consists of three essays on antitrust and regulatory 
economics. In chapter one, I estimate the price and productivity effects of horizontal 
mergers in the ready-mix concrete industry using plant and firm-level data from the 
US Census Bureau. Horizontal mergers involving plants in close proximity are 
associated with price increases and decreases in output, but also raise productivity at 
acquired plants. While there is a significant negative relationship between 
productivity and prices, the rate at which productivity reduces price is modest and the 
effects of increased market power are not offset. I then present several additional new 
results of policy interest. For example, mergers are only observed leading to price 
increases after the relaxation of antitrust standards in the mid-1980s; price increases 
following mergers are persistent but tend to become smaller over time; and, there is 
evidence that firms target plants charging below average prices for acquisition. 
  
Finally, I use a simple multinomial logit demand model to assess the effects of 
merger activity on total welfare. At acquired plants, the consumer and producer 
surplus effects approximately cancel out, but effects at acquiring plants and non-
merging plants, where prices also rise, cause a substantial decrease in consumer 
surplus.  
In chapter two, I introduce a model of anticompetitive exclusive dealing that 
provides a unified treatment of two of the major categories of potentially 
anticompetitive single-firm conduct recognized by the FTC: refusal to deal and 
exclusive purchase agreements. The exclusionary mechanism succeeds by turning the 
incentives of a pivotal buyer or a pivotal coalition of buyers against the incentives of 
the group when buyers attempt to coordinate on their preferred equilibrium. However, 
since all buyers acquiesce to the exclusionary strategy, no pivotal buyer or pivotal 
coalition of buyers emerges that can gain a competitive advantage and all buyers are 
strictly worse off. I argue that this approach provides a simple economic framework 
for evaluating a number of real-world antitrust cases, including the seminal cases 
Lorain Journal and Denstply, which do not fit neatly into the structure of the main 
body of economic research focused on exclusive dealing, the Naked Exclusion 
literature. I then show that by redefining exclusive contracts, this approach can be 
embedded within a Naked Exclusion style model, yielding a number of new results 
with implications for both the economic literature on exclusive dealing and antitrust 
jurisprudence. 
 Finally, in 1970, Congress added Section 36(b) of the Investment Company 
Act, which authorized suits against mutual fund managers for charging “excessive 
  
fees.” In 1979, the SEC prosecuted the first case invoking this law in its enforcement 
action against Fundpack. Although the law and its economic consequences have been 
the subject to extensive debate, including the high profile case Jones v. Harris 
Associates which pitted Judge Frank Easterbrook and Judge Richard Posner against 
each other in the 7th Circuit before going the U.S. Supreme Court, the law has been 
subject to scant rigorous empirical analysis. Along with my co-author Ken Ueda, I 
use program evaluation techniques and the Center for Research in Security Price’s 
mutual fund data to analyze the consequences of the onset of 36(b) enforcement on 
mutual fund fees, fund flows, fund returns, and exit rates before and after SEC v. 
Fundpack. We find that high-fee mutual funds reduced their fees substantially in 
response, but we find no evidence of reduced mutual fund quality or consumer choice 
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In this series of essays, I explore a number of issues related to antitrust and 
regulatory economics. While the subject matter of each essay is distinct, the essays 
are united by a focus on framing the results in terms of their regulatory, legal, and 
institutional context. In emphasizing these areas, the goal is to emphasize the question 
of how markets work in the real world. For instance, the first essay examines the 
effect of horizontal mergers on prices and productivity in the context of the ready-mix 
concrete industry, which has long been subject to extensive scrutiny by the 
Department of Justice. The unique nature of the U.S. Census Bureau data that I 
employ in this study also allows me to explore a number of issues of significant 
economic importance that have received sparse attention due to data limitations.  
Chapter one provides the first rigorous empirical evidence I am aware of on 
the direct relationship between the price, productivity, and welfare effects of  
horizontal mergers, the effects on prices and productivity of the watershed changes in 
antitrust policy that occurred in the United States in the mid-1980s, and the potential 
targeting of “Maverick Firms”—firms that seek to disrupt markets by increasing 
competition—through merger activity. 
In chapter two, I present a new theoretical model of anticompetitive exclusive 
dealing. What distinguishes this essay from the Naked Exclusion literature 
(Rasmusen et al., 1991; Segal and Whinston, 2000; Fumagalli and Motta, 2006; 
Simpson and Wickelgren, 2007; Abito and Wright, 2008; DeGraba, 2013), a family 
of models which serve as the primary applied theoretical framework for 





motivated by a number of real-world antitrust cases including the seminal cases 
Lorain Journal v. United States (1951) and is United States v. Dentsply 
International, Inc. (2005).  
In chapter three, along with my co-author, Ken Ueda, I explore the effects on 
the fees charged by mutual funds of the first case brought against a mutual fund 
manager—SEC v. Fundpack—for charging “excessive fees” under Section 36(b) of 
the Investment Company Act. While this law has been subject to intense debate since 
SEC v. Fundpack was prosecuted by the SEC in 1979 including a major Supreme 
Court case, there has been little rigorous empirical analysis of the law and its 
potential welfare consequences. 
In addition to being united by a common focus on institutional and legal 
context, each of these essays is ultimately about the extent to which competitive entry 
will quickly discipline prices in the absence of regulatory or antitrust enforcement. 
For instance, in chapter one, I show that despite the ready-mix concrete industry 
being characterized by frequent entry and exit, horizontal mergers lead to substantial 
long-term price increases. Although the evidence suggests that price increases are the 
largest in the first year after a merger, significant price increases remain up to five 
years after a merger is consummated. In terms of theory, the theoretical model in 
chapter two emphasizes that in addition to being able to essentially provide bribes to 
customers to prevent entry from a rival, exclusive dealing can also be used to coerce 
buyers into accepting exclusive contracts that preclude rival entry and lead to higher 
prices. Finally, in chapter three, I show that despite substantial competition and 





reaction to a regulatory change occurring in the late 1970s beyond what can be 
explained by the typical effect of market forces on prices. 
A final aspect of these essays that I believe is essential to understanding their 
contribution is their heavy reliance on legal and economic history to attempt to draw 
policy conclusions that are relevant today. Today’s Industrial Organization literature 
offers an impressive array of both theoretical models and empirical models of 
increasing sophistication. Unfortunately, as has been frequently noted, many of these 
tools are difficult to apply or have often been found to be unreliable in the context of 
real-world enforcement. By grounding analyses in a historical perspective, economics 
may prove more able to establish the validity of its mathematical tools and to better 
engage with the realms of law and policy. My hope is that these essays demonstrate 
the abundance of historical data available to researchers that can be used to better 
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Section 1: Introduction 
 
In recent years, empirical research into the consequences of horizontal 
mergers has been a burgeoning area of inquiry and there has been significant progress 
in the retrospective analysis of price effects. A large body of research now provides 
systematic evidence that horizontal mergers are often associated with price increases, 
but research on the output and productivity consequences has lagged behind. 
Furthermore, empirical literature simultaneously examining the price and productivity 
effects of horizontal mergers is virtually non-existent, even though evaluation of the 
tradeoff between market power effects and efficiencies is one of the oldest and most 
important topics in the economic analysis of mergers. 
Using plant and firm-level data collected by the U.S. Census Bureau for the 
ready-mix concrete industry, this study seeks to fill the gap in the literature by 
evaluating the price, output, and productivity effects of horizontal mergers. I find that 
horizontal mergers involving plants in close geographic proximity are associated with 
significant price increases and decreases in output, but also significant increases in 
productivity at acquired plants. While there is a negative relationship between 
productivity and prices, the rate at which productivity reduces price is small enough 





higher prices but not productivity at acquiring plants and non-merging plants located 
nearby to horizontally acquired plants. 
I then use a simple aggregate-data multinomial logit demand model to 
calculate the total welfare impact of the horizontal mergers in my sample, building on 
the framework first suggested by Williamson (1968) to assess the tradeoff between 
the welfare effects of increased efficiency and higher prices. At acquired plants, the 
consumer and producer surplus effects of mergers approximately cancel each other 
out, but effects at acquiring plants and non-merging plants, where prices also rise, 
cause a substantial decrease in consumer surplus of approximately $170 million 
(1987 dollars) leading to a net decline in total welfare of approximately $30 million 
for the entire sample. This consumer surplus loss represents approximately 4% of 
ready-mix concrete revenues in affected markets. 
The horizontal merger retrospective literature has been highly influential 
among academic economists and has even gained the attention of the general public. 
Numerous studies have shown across a spectrum of industries that prices have risen 
following approved mergers (Ashenfelter et al., 2014). The conclusions of the 
academic literature have influenced merger enforcement, informing regulatory efforts 
at the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and have 
even affected the public perception of merger policy. Yet, despite the importance and 
influence of the horizontal merger retrospective literature, it has at least three 
significant limitations that I seek to address. 
First, and most importantly, almost none of this literature has addressed the 





net welfare implications of mergers, output and efficiencies, instead focusing solely 
on prices. To a large extent, this gap reflects the fact that the previous literature has 
lacked data on establishment or plant level quantity sold and input data necessary to 
calculate productivity.1 The US Census Bureau’s plant-level data allows me to 
observe quantities of concrete sold and construct a measure of productivity for each 
observation in my sample so that I can simultaneously evaluate prices, output, and 
productivity over a long time horizon (1977 to 1992). 
Second, most of the literature on horizontal mergers has focused on individual 
mergers, or a small number of mergers. For example, one of the most well-known, 
recent papers, Miller and Weinberg (2015), focuses on a 2008 joint venture between 
SAB Miller and Coors brewing companies. Another prominent example is 
Ashenfelter et al. (2013), which assesses the competitive impact of the Maytag-
Whirlpool merger. The focus on small samples of mergers makes it difficult to 
control for the possible endogeneity of which firms choose to merge. In my data, 
however, I observe over 400 plants engaged in horizontal merger activity over a 
15-year time period. I also observe a large number of characteristics of both plants 
and markets, which makes it possible to estimate models that control for many types 
of selection on observables. A key finding of my paper is that both the direction and 
the size of my baseline price and productivity estimates are very robust to several 
different types of observable controls, which provides support for a causal 
interpretation of the results. Yet, because mergers are not natural experiments, my 
                                                 
1 Establishments are defined by the Census as the specific location where business activity occurs 
while firms are defined as all establishments under common operational control. Here, all 





case for a causal interpretation ultimately relies on a variety of evidence. For 
example, the pattern of price increases in the data is accompanied by decreases in 
plant level output, which is precisely what would be expected as a result of the 
creation of additional market power. I find significant price increases due to 
horizontal mergers after a relaxation in antitrust enforcement standards in the  
mid-1980s, but no evidence of systematic price increases before. I also find that price 
increases are associated solely with horizontal mergers as opposed to other types of 
mergers and that price increases are associated exclusively with local merger activity. 
Third, much of the evidence on the consequences of horizontal mergers has 
come from differentiated-product industries where measuring merger effects may be 
made more difficult because products often change their physical quality, package 
size or how they are sold. In contrast, I look at ready-mix concrete where the product 
is close to being physically homogenous. There is, of course, geographical 
differentiation in the industry, but this is a feature that I am able to exploit in order to 
distinguish mergers involving local plants and mergers involving geographically 
distant plants, where market power effects are likely to be absent. 
The literature specifically addressing the relationship between horizontal 
mergers and efficiencies at any level is very small and based entirely on indirect 
evidence. Indeed, analysis of the relationship between horizontal mergers and 
efficiencies is currently limited to two studies of which I am aware. The first 
examines the effects of changes in transportation costs associated with the Miller-
Coors joint venture (Ashenfelter et al., 2015). The second examines the timing of 





the short-term market power effects dominate leading to higher prices, but in the 
long-term lower prices reflect the realization of efficiencies (Focarelli and Panetta, 
2003). My study is the first within the literature that directly assesses the empirical 
relationship between productivity and price following merger activity. Furthermore, I 
observe price and productivity at five year intervals so that I can directly examine this 
relationship over time. Specifically, I am able to determine the precise year in which 
each merger takes place in my data so that I can distinguish between short-term and 
long-term effects. 
There is a more extensive literature on the relationship between mergers and 
productivity, with some of the most recent literature also explicitly considering price 
effects or markups (Hortaçsu and Syverson, 2007; Braguinsky et al., 2015; Blonigen 
and Pierce, 2016). However, none of these studies have distinguished between types 
of mergers and have focused on mergers as a whole rather than horizontal mergers. 
Furthermore, with the exception of Blonigen and Pierce, these studies have not found 
evidence of systematic price increases and have emphasized efficiencies rather than 
market power effects. Conversely, Blonigen and Pierce find evidence of higher 
markups but not productivity increases as a result of merger activity, so there is no 
examination of the tradeoff between market power effects and efficiencies. 
An advantage of this study is that productivity is measured directly following 
the recent trend of evaluating productivity in terms of total factor productivity 
calculated with respect to quantity or TFPQ (Hortaçsu and Syverson, 2007; 
Braguinsky et al., 2015). However, my results also have implications for the older 





total factor productivity measured with respect to revenue or TFPR (McGuckin and 
Nguyen, 1995; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001). Because data on revenue is more 
abundant than data on quantity, the largest studies of productivity and mergers use 
TFPR instead of TFPQ. But, because TFPR is both a function of price and TFPQ, 
TFPR will provide an unreliable estimate of productivity if mergers have systematic 
effects on prices. This problem is well known in the literature and has been addressed 
by assuming that antitrust enforcement is sufficient to eliminate a systematic upward 
bias (McGuckin and Nguyen, 1995). Yet, to date, there has been little research 
directly examining the validity of this assumption. 
Section 2 of this paper considers data and measurement issues and provides 
details about the ready-mix concrete industry, the sample of plants, the calculation of 
total factor productivity, and the identification of merger activity. Section 3 
introduces my methodology and presents the primary regression results. Section 4 
introduces a demand model to evaluate the welfare impact of the mergers in my 
sample, and Section 5 offers concluding remarks. 
 
Section 2: Data and Measurement 
2.1: Ready-Mix Concrete 
 
The ready-mix concrete industry has become popular in economic research 
due to its unique characteristics and because of the detailed data collected for the 
industry through the Census of Manufactures (CM). The CM occurs every 5 years 





For 1977–1982, the CM also collected product specific revenue and quantity data 
from plants in the ready-mix concrete industry. These data have been used 
extensively in the economic literature on productivity to calculate TFPQ (Syverson, 
2004a,b; Hortaçsu and Syverson, 2007; Foster et al., 2008, 2016; Collard-Wexler, 
2013; Backus, 2016). Here, I use the sample of ready-mix concrete plants with non-
imputed product specific revenue and quantity data from Foster et al. (2016).2 
Ready-mix concrete is a mixture of water, cement, gravel, and other chemical 
admixtures. The vast majority of ready-mix concrete is purchased by the construction 
sector (Syverson, 2004a). The ingredients of ready-mix concrete are typically mixed 
at a central plant and then transported to construction sites. The American Society for 
Testing and Materials (ASTM) standards specify that ready-mix concrete should be 
transported and discharged within 1.5 hours of initial mixing. Although this 
stipulation can be waived by the purchaser, the perishability of the product and the 
cost of transporting it result in a highly localized market for ready-mix concrete 
(Collard-Wexler, 2013). The Census’ Commodity Transportation Survey indicates 
that ready-mix concrete plants ship approximately 95 percent of their output by 
weight less than 100 miles (Syverson, 2004a). 
Following Syverson (2004a), ready-mix concrete markets are often defined in 
the economic literature in terms of the BEA’s 1995 Component Economic 
                                                 
2 The foundation of this dataset was originally developed in Foster et al. (2008). Although this study 
attempted to identify all observations with imputed product specific revenue and quantity data using a 
variety of methods, the original impute flags in the raw Census data had been lost. White et al. (2015) 
recovered the missing impute flags and these recovered flags were applied in Foster et al. (2016). As 
approximately half of the original sample was imputed, in Appendix A of this paper, I evaluate the 
robustness of my conclusions applying inverse propensity score weighting to the primary results. I 





Areas (CEAs). CEAs partition all 3,141 counties and county equivalents in the United 
States into 348 market areas designed to capture linked economic activity (Backus, 
2016). CEAs are then combined by the BEA to form 172 Economic Areas or EAs. 
CEAs have the benefit of providing a contiguous, relatively compact market 
definition for the ready-mix concrete industry. 
However, for the purposes of assessing the market power effects of horizontal 
mergers, CEAs are potentially problematic. First, plants on opposite ends of a CEA 
will often be too geographically distant to be directly competitive. Second, because 
CEAs partition the United States into contiguous geographic entities, two plants on 
the edges of different CEAs may be in much closer geographic proximity than either 
plant is to other plants within the CEA. Thus, for the purposes of my empirical 
analysis of market power, I define an alternative geographic area: the adjacent county 
block (ACB). For a given plant, an ACB constitutes the county in which the plant is 
located and the immediately adjacent counties. This strategy essentially restricts the 
competitive ambit of a given plant to a small surrounding geographic area. In 
Figure 1.1, I provide a map that depicts the ACB associated with the Washington, 
D.C. county equivalent. 
The map in Figure 1.1 depicts Washington, D.C. and its adjacent counties 
Montgomery, Prince George’s, Arlington, Fairfax, and Alexandria and also indicates 
the locations of some of the current major ready-mix concrete plants in the 
Washington metro area. All of the plants denoted with red squares are within the 
Washington, DC ACB as they are located either in Washington or in one of the 





Figure 1.1: The Washington, D.C. Adjacent County Block 
 
 
be in the Arlington County ACB, as Prince George’s is not directly adjacent to 
Arlington. While CEAs contain over 9 counties on average, ACBs in my sample have 
an average of 6 counties. Furthermore, because ACBs are drawn as circles of counties 
around plants a merging plant is always centrally located within its ACB. Finally, 
ACBs represent a convenient unit of analysis because the constituent units of CEAs 
and EAs are also counties, facilitating direct comparison of the different market 
definitions. However, because ACBs are necessarily overlapping, when structurally 










Following Foster et al. (2008), TFP is calculated using the typical index form. 
Specifically, for each plant , TFP takes the form: 
 TFP = − − − −  (1) 
where the lower-case letters indicate respectively, the (log) values of gross output, 
labor input, capital, materials, and energy inputs, and the  coefficients are factor 
elasticities that are assumed to be invariant within the industry. 
Labor inputs are measured, following Baily et al. (1992), as production-
worker hours multiplied by the ratio of total payroll to payroll for production workers 
and the corresponding variable is denoted as LABOR below. Capital inputs are the 
book values reported by plants for their structural and equipment capital stocks 
deflated to 1987 levels using sector-specific deflators from the BEA. The capital 
variables are identified separately and are denoted as STRUCTURE and 
EQUIPMENT. Materials and energy inputs are plants’ reported expenditures deflated 
using the corresponding input price indices from the NBER Productivity Database. 
These variables are denoted as MATERIALS and ENERGY. 
The factor elasticities are calculated as industry-level cost shares aggregated 
over the sample period.3 Cost shares are a widely used method for calculating factor 
elasticities as they avoid the classic endogeneity problem involved in estimating 
production functions (Syverson, 2011). However, this attractive feature requires us to 
rely on the following assumptions: (1) that plants are cost-minimizing, (2) that the 
                                                 






first order conditions linking observed output shares to out- put elasticities hold on 
average eliminating the effects of idiosyncratic adjustment cost-induced 
misalignments in input levels,4 and (3) that the production function exhibits constant 
returns to scale. The advantages and disadvantages of the various approaches to 
calculating productivity have been discussed at length in the literature. 
Van Biesebroeck (2007) shows that cost shares are particularly effective relative to 
other methodologies, including techniques relying on structural estimation of the 
production function, when changes in productivity are of interest as is the case here. 
Nevertheless, there has been immense progress in the structural estimation of 
production functions over the last decades (Olley and Pakes, 1996; Levinsohn and 
Petrin, 2003; Wooldridge, 2009; Ackerberg et al., 2015). Applying the methodology 
suggested in (Wooldridge, 2009) produces very similar productivity estimates. 
The labor, materials, and energy cost shares are calculated using reported 
expenditures from the CM. Capital cost shares are the reported equipment and 
building stocks multiplied by the capital rental rates matched to ready mix-concrete’s 
two-digit industry code. As discussed above, I consider two measures of TFP in this 
study: TFPQ and TFPR. For TFPQ,  in the equation above is each plants’ physical 
output of concrete measured in thousands of cubic yards. For TFPR,  is the nominal 
                                                 
4 Using plant plant-specific cost shares instead of industry-specific would require a much stronger 
assumption that the first order conditions hold for every plant. Previous research considering the use of 
plant-specific cost shares has found that conclusions regarding average productivity effects are quite 






revenue from product sales deflated by the revenue weighted geometric mean price 




I identify merger activity by linking the CM to the Census Bureau’s 
Longitudinal Business Database (LBD). The LBD maintains distinct identifiers for 
establishments (in this case plants) and firms (Firm ID) allowing researchers to 
observe how for a given set of plants ownership structure evolves over time. 
Consequently, the Firm ID variable in the LBD has been used extensively in the 
economic literature to track changes in ownership (Haltiwanger et al., 2013; 
Davis et al., 2014). I use this Firm ID variable both to identify merger activity and to 
distinguish horizontal mergers from other types of mergers in the ready-mix concrete 
industry. 
Table 1.1 provides some basic information on the frequency of mergers within 
the data to help clarify the distinctions between the categories of plants involved in 
merger activity.6 For now, these distinctions are defined without any geographic 
                                                 
5 An alternative measure of productivity, labeled TFPT by Foster et al. (2008), uses plant level revenue 
as opposed to product specific revenue. Using this nomenclature, much of the classic literature on 
mergers and productivity relies on TFPT as plant level revenue is more readily available than product 
specific revenue. I find that both TFPR and TFPT are inflated from price increases associated with 
horizontal merger activity, but that the exaggeration of productivity is much larger using TFPR. 
Although a somewhat minor point, it is worth noting that this can be taken as additional evidence that 
the price increases I document are the result of enhanced market power. The inflation of revenue is 
primarily revenue derived from the sale of ready-mix concrete as opposed to revenue related to other 
income sources. 
 
6 Given the preliminary nature of these results, to facilitate the disclosure of updated results in the 





limitations. Later in this section, I explicitly distinguish local mergers from non-local 
mergers. 
 
Table 1.1: Categorization of Merger Activity 
 Plants 
TOTAL 1,980 
ACQUIRED ALL 320 
ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL 200 
ACQUIRING 220 
 
The total sample includes 1,980 plant-year observations. Since changes in 
price and productivity are the dependent variables of interest, the sample is limited to 
plants with both price and quantity in year  and year + 5 (denoted as ). The 
variable ACQUIRED ALL refers to the total number of plants undergoing an 
identifiable ownership change as indicated by a change in the Firm ID variable 
between year  and . Horizontal mergers in the data take two forms which are 
depicted schematically in Figure 1.2. 
 










































In the Type 1 merger, Firm B exists both before and after the merger. When 
Plant 1 is purchased, it takes on the Firm ID “B,” while Plant 2 and Plant 3 maintain 
the Firm ID “B.” Thus, Plant 1 is labeled as “acquired” because its Firm ID changes. 
Plant 2 and Plant 3 are clearly involved in the merger but do not experience a change 
in Firm ID and are consequently labeled “acquiring” plants. In the Type 2 merger, no 
plant is labeled as an “acquiring” plant because all of the plants involved experience a 
change in Firm ID. The subset of ACQUIRED ALL plants that fit either of the patterns 
indicated above are labeled ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL. Plants that are part of firms 
that are involved in the acquisition of at least one plant but do not experience a 
change in Firm ID as indicated in the Type 1 merger are labeled as ACQUIRING. 
A theme of this study will be assessing how the distinction between acquiring 
and acquired plants affects merger dynamics and outcomes. In Table 1.2, I begin this 
process examining the extent to which there are important differences between 
ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL, ACQUIRING, and non-merging plants pre-merger. 
 
Table 1.2: Pre-Merger Characteristics of ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL/ACQUIRING 
Plants 
 [2.1] [2.2] [2.3] [2.4] 
Dep. Var. REVENUE QUANTITY PRICE TFPQ 
ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL 
−0.017 −0.010 −0.007 −0.007 
(0.129) (0.133) (0.017) (0.028) 
ACQUIRING 
−0.061 −0.075 0.014 0.064*** 
(0.093) (0.095) (0.019) (0.024) 
R-Squared 0.399 0.397 0.454 0.405 
N 1,980 1,980 1,980 1,980 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
Regressions control for EA-year interactions. Standard errors are clustered by CEA. Dependent 






In Table 1.2, I consider the relationship between plants involved in horizontal 
merger activity and initial revenue, quantity, price, and TFPQ by regressing each 
variable against the ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL and ACQUIRING plant dummies 
and sweeping out EA-year effects. Each observation represents a plant-year 
combination. The most striking result of this table is that for horizontal merger 
activity (defined in aggregate without geographic distinction) there are no significant 
pre-merger distinctions between plants except that ACQUIRING plants have above 
average productivity. This result is particularly interesting in light of the firm 
dynamics literature (Jovanovic, 1979, 1982; Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002), which 
predicts a high productivity buys low productivity dynamic as well-managed buyers 
purchase poorly-managed sellers to reallocate capital. Here, I find evidence that the 
ACQUIRING plants are indeed high productivity, but that the 
ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL plants are of average, rather than low, productivity. The 
results presented in the next section will help shed further light on these patterns. 
Because of the local nature of ready-mix concrete markets, distinguishing 
between local and non-local merger activity is a potentially important source of 
variation. I define local merger activity in terms of adjacent county blocks or ACBs. 
Specifically, for a given horizontally acquired plant, the plant is defined as 
ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL ACB if and only if within the ACB surrounding the plant 
there is at least one other acquiring or acquired plant associated with the same 
acquiring firm. The acquiring plants that are associated with within ACB mergers 
according to the above definition are denoted as ACQUIRING ACB. Table 1.3 





mergers to within CEA horizontal mergers, within EA horizontal mergers, and 
horizontal mergers defined with no geographic limitations. 
 
Table 1.3: Geographic Pattern of Horizontal Merger Activity 
 ALL EA CEA ACB 
ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL 200 180 160 160 
ACQUIRING 200 80 60 20 
 
A number of patterns are evident in Table 1.3. First, ready-mix concrete 
acquisitions are highly clustered within relatively small geographic areas such that the 
vast majority of acquired plants are located in at least the same EA as another plant 
involved in the merger. Indeed, most acquired plants are even more locally situated. 
On the other hand, most acquiring plants lie outside of the areas where merger 
activity is taking place. To a large extent this distinction reflects that fact that for a 
given acquiring plant within a geographic area there are often multiple acquired 
plants. Another related issue, is that in a Type 2 merger as defined above, there need 
not be an acquiring plant, so that clusters of acquired plants can be assembled within 
a geographic area without the presence of an acquiring plant. Taken as whole, these 
patterns provide some initial evidence that ready-mix concrete firms engage in 
carefully selected, highly targeted merger behavior that involves clustering acquired 
plants in close geographic proximity, while being highly selective about which 








Section 3: Methodology and Results 
 
3.1: Descriptive Results 
 
This section begins with an essentially descriptive analysis that relates 
changes in the dependent variables of interest to horizontal merger activity. 
Specifically, for plant  at time  in EA , I consider the model 
 Δ = +  +  + +  (2) 
restricting the acquired and acquiring variables to only within-ACB mergers 
(ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL ACB and ACQUIRING ACB). The only controls are a 
full set of EA-year interactions denoted by . Standard errors are clustered at the 
CEA level, which will also be the case in all of the analyses below.7 Because 
evaluating the effects of mergers on consumers is the focus of this study, all results 
are also quantity weighted. Specifically, I use Davis et al. (1996) activity weights 
which are calculated as the average of the year  and year  quantity sold for each 
plant. In Appendix A1.2, I present unweighted results as a robustness check. The 
pattern of results in both the weighted and unweighted analyses is economically very 
similar, although the coefficient estimates and the level of statistical significance tend 
to be higher for the weighted results. 
Table 1.4 presents the results from estimating the descriptive model with 
changes in prices, quantity, and TFPQ as the dependent variables. 
 
                                                 
7 All results and conclusions are extremely similar if clustering is done at the EA level as opposed to 






Table 1.4: Descriptive Results 
 [4.1] [4.2] [4.3] 
Dep. Var. QUANTITY PRICE TFPQ 
ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL ACB 
 0.068*** −0.106 0.087*** 
 (0.019) (0.069) (0.032) 
ACQUIRING ACB 
 0.039 −0.057 0.097 
 (0.066) (0.184) (0.085) 
R-Squared  0.377 0.541 0.347 
N  1,980 1,980 1,980 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
Regressions control for EA-year interactions. Standard errors are clustered by CEA. 
 
Regression [4.1] indicates a price increase of approximately 7% for 
ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL ACB plants significant at the 1% level. The estimated 
price increase at ACQUIRING ACB plants is approximately 4% but is not statistically 
significant. Regression [4.2] indicates a quantity decrease of over 10% approaching 
significance at the 10% level for ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL ACB plants. 
Regression [4.3] indicates an increase in TFPQ for ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL ACB 
plants of approximately 9% significant at the 1% level and an increase for 




Moving from a descriptive to a causal analysis of merger activity is inherently 
challenging as there are many possible sources of selection that may induce merger 
activity. Thus, one way to interpret the subsequent results is simply as a series of 
analyses establishing a robust pattern comparing the average change in 
price/quantity/TFPQ for merging plants to the average change for all other plants. 





studies, I proceed by considering how the CM data can help address sources of 
selection that are typically difficult to control for when studying merger activity. 
The primary tool I use to address the issue of selection is the rich set of plant 
specific controls available through the CM. Many of these variables, including input 
expenditures and variables like TFPR or revenue, are endogenous to the firm’s profit 
maximization problem. Thus, they will likely be correlated with factors that are 
otherwise difficult to control for, like quality, plant capacity, and financial health. To 
illustrate how the controls, in particular these lagged endogenous variables, can be 
applied to help mitigate selection, consider the following simple model. Suppose that 
in the absence of any changes in market structure, the level of prices for plant  at 
time  in geographic region  is set according to the linear model 
 = + +  (3) 
where  is price,  is a vector of plant specific variables, and  is a vector of 
market level factors influencing demand. Since we are interested in the relationship 
between changes in price and merger activity, this price setting process motivates the 
following model relating the average price effect of merger activity to the first 
difference of price 
 Δ = + + Δ + Δ  (4) 
where  represents a merger and  is now the lag of the vector of plant specific 
variables influencing price.8 In using variables endogenous to the plant’s profit 
maximization problem to identify the price effect of merger activity one would not 
                                                 
8 For the sake of simplicity, in this section I abstract from the potential differences between acquired 





want to control for ∆ , as including post-merger realizations of the plant specific 
variables could confound estimation of merger specific price effects (Wooldridge, 
2010). On the other hand, because the endogenous variables in  are realized 
prior to the consummation of a merger, they will likely account for sources of 
unobserved heterogeneity that may create selection bias. Thus, the net effect of 
mergers on price will be identified if ∆  is conditionally independent of  after 
controlling for  and ∆ . Before moving on, however, it is important to note 
that there are specific timing assumptions implicit in this model. For instance, the 
model above assumes that selection into merger activity is based on the level of the 
lagged variables in . But, if, for instance, changes in service quality are what 
drive selection rather than the level of service quality, controlling for the lagged 
differences of the endogenous variables may represent a more appropriate control 
than the levels of the endogenous variables. Furthermore, the model above assumes 
that that the plant characteristics inducing selection are fully present at time . But, as 
the data are only observed at five year intervals, it is possible that the controls will not 
be as effective for mergers occurring later in each five-year period as there is 
unobserved heterogeneity in within each time period between observations. Thus, in 
presenting the results after applying my control strategy, I also discuss additional 
analyses that suggest that the results are robust to concerns about timing. 
Of course, even taking the structure of this model as given, conditional 
independence is a very strong assumption. To see how selection may confound a 
causal interpretation of the results, consider the following examples. While as a 





can differentiate themselves by providing superior service.9 Suppose that high-quality 
plants are able to charge higher prices as a result of improved service, but that the full 
potential for price increases is realized with a lag as it takes time for the market to 
learn about quality advantages. If firms looking to make acquisitions target high-
quality plants, then it is possible mergers will be associated with price increases, but 
not as a result of acquisitions per se. As another example, suppose that plants that 
have limited productive capacity are more likely to raise prices in the presence of 
demand shocks as their ability to increase output will be constrained.10 If firms 
anticipating positive demand shocks in a region target capacity constrained plants, 
then post-merger prices may rise, but again for reasons unrelated to mergers 
themselves. Thus, in the next section I conduct a detailed analysis of the control 
strategy and the extent to which it helps support a causal interpretation of the results. 
In particular, I examine how the controls can help address selection stories like these 
and a host of related threats to my identification strategy. 
 
3.3: Selection on Observables 
 
While the controls that I have are rich relative to the previous literature, given 
the myriad of selection stories that are possible, arriving at a plausibly causal 
interpretation requires careful examination of how the underlying results are affected 
by the controls. I show in this section that while the controls I apply are often 
powerful predictors of the dependent variables, not only do all of the effects reported 
                                                 
9 In my discussions with industry participants, service quality is typically offered as the primary 
differentiating factor among ready-mix concrete providers. 
 





above remain statistically significant, but the magnitudes remain very similar as well. 
Indeed, to the extent adding controls has any appreciable effect, the overall results 
tend to become stronger. 
Table 1.5 considers the effects of first controlling for lagged TFPR by itself 
and then adding controls for the lagged inputs EQUIPMENT, STRUCTURE, LABOR, 
MATERIALS, and ENERGY for each of the dependent variables from Table 1.4. As 
TFPR is a function of both revenue and efficiency, high TFPR firms will tend to be 
high profit firms. Accordingly, controlling for TFPR can be thought of as controlling 
for selection on profitability. 
Lagged TFPR is a strong predictor of each dependent variable and is 
significant at the 1% level in all regressions in Table 1.5. Nevertheless, as indicated in 
regression [5.1], the coefficient estimate for the price increase at ACQUIRED 
HORIZONTAL ACB plants remains over 6% and is significant at the 1% level. The 
economic significance of the estimated quantity decrease for ACQUIRED 
HORIZONTAL ACB plants in [5.3] remains similar to that from the descriptive 
model, but as the coefficient is slightly larger in magnitude it is now statistically 
significant at the 10% level. Controlling for lagged TFPR has strongest effect when 
the dependent variable is the change in TFPQ. The coefficient estimate remains 
substantial and significant at the 1% level but is now approximately 6%. Across all 
regressions the coefficients on the ACQUIRING ACB dummies remain non-
significant and of similar magnitudes to the results from Table A1.1. 
Regressions [5.2], [5.4], and [5.6] add the additional lagged endogenous input 





Table 1.5: Results Controlling for Lagged Endogenous Variables 
 [5.1] [5.2] [5.3] [5.4] [5.5] [5.6] 
Dep. Var. PRICE PRICE QUANTITY QUANTITY TFPQ TFPQ 
ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL ACB 
0.061*** 0.062*** −0.117* −0.118* 0.061*** 0.058** 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.069) (0.068) (0.028) (0.028) 
ACQUIRING ACB 
0.036 0.041 −0.063 −0.052 0.081 0.090 
(0.064) (0.066) (0.182) (0.160) (0.054) (0.055) 
TFPR 
−0.140*** −0.156*** −0.264*** −0.270*** −0.631*** −0.652*** 
(0.040) (0.042) (0.097) (0.091) (0.060) (0.062) 
EQUIPMENT 
 −0.002  −0.031  0.006 
 (0.007)  (0.034)  (0.013) 
STRUCTURE 
 −0.012***  0.029  −0.008 
 (0.004)  (0.020)  (0.008) 
LABOR 
 −0.021*  0.012  −0.025 
 (0.012)  (0.039)  (0.017) 
MATERIALS 
 0.023*  −0.195***  0.011 
 (0.012)  (0.035)  (0.016) 
ENERGY 
 0.006  0.012  −0.002 
 (0.006)  (0.016)  (0.008) 
R-Squared 0.393 0.400 0.545 0.582 0.507 0.511 
N 1,980 1,980 1,980 1,980 1,980 1,980 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. Regressions control for EA-year interactions and include quantity 
weights. Standard errors are clustered by CEA. Additional controls are lagged TFPR (TFPR), lagged capital equipment (EQUIPMENT), lagged structural 






problem, they are set with respect to precisely the sort of unobserved factors 
that may induce problematic selection.1 Yet, despite being individually significant 
predictors of price and quantity effects (although not TFPQ), inclusion of these 
variables has very little effect on the merger-related coefficient estimates. 
Returning to the capacity story from the previous section, we might be 
concerned that the combination of capacity constraints and demand shocks could 
create a spurious correlation between mergers and prices. However, as structural and 
to some extent equipment capital will reflect plant capacity, the lack of movement in 
the coefficients after controlling for these observed inputs suggests that this source of 
selection is not driving the results. Or, in terms of the service quality story from the 
previous section, we might be concerned that the descriptive results attribute price 
increases to mergers because firms target high quality providers.2 The idea behind the 
control strategy is that initial unobserved heterogeneity in quality will be reflected in 
the lagged endogenous variables. Specifically, using the lagged values of the input 
variables seems like a potentially effective strategy as firm’s input choices will likely 
be linked to unobserved heterogeneity in quality. Furthermore, it seems highly 
plausible that at least some of the benefits of providing high quality service will be 
realized in the short-run. While this connection is less direct than the application of 
initial capital to control for capacity constraints, the essential point is that at least 
                                                 
1 The rationale for including these variables is based on the same unobserved heterogeneity that has 
driven the literature on estimating production functions. 
2 In terms of addressing the question of the appropriate timing of the control variables, it is unclear 
from a theoretical standpoint whether it is better to take advantage of the larger amount of cross-
sectional variation associated with using lagged levels or lagged differences, which require plants to 
have at least 10 years of data. However, as I discuss below, from a practical standpoint, the distinction 






some significant proportion of unobserved product quality is likely to be reflected in 
these variables. As such, to the extent that this source of selection is driving the 
results, one would expect to see substantial movement in the coefficient estimates.3 
But even after controlling for lags of these endogenous variables that are likely to be 
strongly correlated with a number of different sources of selection, the results remain 
strongly robust. 
Table 1.6 continues the process of adding control variables likely to be 
associated with unobserved plant heterogeneity. 
In regressions [6.1], [6.3], and [6.5], the TFPR control is removed and 
replaced with separate controls for lagged TFPQ and lagged revenue. Separating 
TFPR into supply and demand side controls allows for the possibility that selection 
on efficiency might be a distinct source of bias in addition to selection on financial 
status. Lagged TFPQ is a strong and highly significant predictor of each dependent 
variable, while revenue has a large and significant effect on the change in price, but 
not the change in quantity or TFPQ. As far as effects on the merger variables of 
interest, these controls create a slight increase in the estimated price increase for 
acquired plants with an estimated effect of over 7%. The estimated price effect for 
acquiring plants increases more substantially to over 6% but remains statistically 
insignificant. The coefficient estimates for [6.3] and [6.5] remain very similar, with 
the exception of the relationship between TFPQ and acquiring plants which remains 
insignificant and is now also of a much smaller magnitude.
                                                 
3 To frame this argument differently, had I found significant movement in the coefficients, I would not 
argue that I had effectively controlled for all of the unobserved heterogeneity. Rather, this would be 
indicative that the potential influence of the remaining unobserved heterogeneity would be too great to 





Table 1.6: Benchmark Results 
 [6.1] [6.2] [6.3] [6.4] [6.5] [6.6] 
Dep. Var. PRICE PRICE QUANTITY QUANTITY TFPQ TFPQ 
ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL ACB 
0.075*** 0.079*** −0.119* −0.113* 0.064*** 0.058** 
(0.018) (0.019) (0.067) (0.069) (0.023) (0.023) 
ACQUIRING ACB 
0.064 0.065 −0.081 −0.125 0.033 0.022 
(0.057) (0.058) (0.157) (0.148) (0.041) (0.040) 
TFPQ 
0.309*** 0.307*** −0.403*** −0.408*** −0.842*** −0.838*** 
(0.045) (0.045) (0.114) (0.112) (0.074) (0.074) 
REVENUE 
−0.240*** −0.237*** −0.066 −0.099 0.034 0.019 
(0.039) (0.038) (0.072) (0.075) (0.034) (0.035) 
MU 
 −0.020  −0.029  0.014 
 (0.038)  (0.037)  (0.016) 
AGE 
 0.001  −0.005  −0.004 
 (0.002)  (0.008)  (0.003) 
CONSTRUCTION 
 0.057  0.470***  −0.028 
 (0.053)  (0.144)  (0.050) 
DENSITY 
 0.002  0.065***  0.014* 
 (0.005)  (0.019)  (0.007) 
R-Squared 0.455 0.457 0.589 0.600 0.608 0.612 
N 1,980 1,980 1,980 1,980 1,980 1,980 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. Regressions control for equipment capital, structural capital, labor 
input, materials input, energy input, EA-year interactions and include quantity weights. Additional controls are lagged TFPQ (TFPQ), lagged revenue 
(REVENUE), multi-unit status (MU), age (AGE), change in construction employment (CONSTRUCTION), and population density (DENSITY). Standard errors 






Regressions [6.2], [6.4], and [6.6] add controls for multi-unit status and age 
and also CEA-level demand controls for the change in construction employment and 
population density. Multi-unit status and age are frequently used as controls in 
research using Census microdata, and age has been shown to be a particularly 
important predictor of establishment level growth (Haltiwanger et al., 2013). 
Nevertheless, both variables have almost no effect on the dependent variables. It is 
important to note, however, that before inclusion of the lagged endogenous variables, 
age has a statistically significant effect on each of the dependent variables. The 
additional demand controls are not significant predictors of changes in price, although 
it bears emphasis that in the absence of the EA-year interaction, construction is a very 
strong and significant predictor of changes in price. On the other hand, both demand 
controls are strong predictors of changes in quantity and population density has a 
modest and significant effect on changes in productivity. Again, the conclusion 
remains the same. Despite the addition of these additional control variables, the 
estimates remain very similar across each dependent variable. 
The robustness of the relationship between mergers and the dependent 
variables is the first piece of evidence offered in support of a causal interpretation of 
the results from this paper. Of course, there remain a number of potential threats to a 
causal interpretation that must be acknowledged. Some of these threats are addressed 
in additional analyses not included here for the sake of brevity. For instance, one 
might be concerned that the proper control variables for this analysis are changes in 
the lagged endogenous variables rather than levels. Implementing this strategy 





analysis to a sub-sample of plants with 10 years of data and also requires that the first 
plant-year observation must be dropped. Thus, in my primary analysis, I employ 
lagged levels. Nevertheless, the results remain very similar if lagged differences are 
implemented with the necessarily reduced sample.1 In fact, the estimated price effects 
are slightly larger.2 
Another concern is measurement error, which could be amplified by the use of 
lagged endogenous control variables. However, as the results are very similar before 
and after adding revenue and independent variables, it is unlikely that measurement 
error is a major confounding factor. In addition, I have performed the analysis above 
instrumenting for the lagged input and revenue variables with the double lag of each 
variable. Again, the results remain very similar. This is unsurprising, as it is 
consistent with the findings of previous research using this data (Foster et al., 2008). 
Even with these results, the case for a causal interpretation would be 
significantly stronger with evidence suggesting that the observed price increases are 
the result of market power. Thus, in the next section I address the question of market 
power using two related approaches. First, I refine my comparisons of the different 
categories of plants to distinguish between types of mergers likely to be associated 
with market power. Second, I consider the overall pattern of results and whether this 
is consistent with a market power interpretation. For instance, one of the most 
                                                 
1 Another potential problem discussed in the previous section is that the controls may be less effective 
in controlling for selection the later a merger occurs in five-year period between observations. Thus, I 
have also conducted analysis considering the robustness of the results based on the timing of mergers. I 
find that regardless of when mergers take place, the magnitudes and significance levels remain very 
similar before and after implementation of the control strategy. 
 
2 The likely reason for an increase in the estimated price effects using lagged differences is that my 
sample is necessarily restricted to plants during the period from 1982 to 1992, which as shown in Table 





compelling pieces of evidence in favor of a market power interpretation is one I have 
already presented evidence for and will continue to develop: that price increases are 
accompanied by decreases in output at acquired plants. The benchmark results 
suggest that an approximately 8% increase in price is associated with an over 11% 
decrease in quantity sold. Because, as emphasized above, higher quality is primarily a 
function of superior service rather than physical attributes, offering a higher quality 
product will be unlikely to change the amount of ready-mix concrete necessary for a 
project. Consequently, evidence of price increases unaccompanied by decreases in 
output suggest a market power effect rather than merger specific changes in quality. 
In addition to this test, I examine price effects at plants not engaged in local merger 
activity, the initial pricing conditions that precede merger activity, and the timing of 
the price effects relative to when mergers are consummated. 
 
3.4: Market Power 
 
Table 1.7 assesses changes in price and quantity for within ACB mergers 
versus horizontal mergers lacking a local component using the full set of controls 
from Table 1.6. Acquired and acquiring plants associated with non-local horizontal 







Table 1.7: Local Versus Non-Local Horizontal Merger Results 
 [7.1] [7.2] [7.3] [7.4] [7.5] [7.6] 
Dep. Var. PRICE PRICE PRICE PRICE QUANTITY QUANTITY 
ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL ACB 
0.082*** 0.100*** 0.107*** 0.125*** −0.126* −0.170** 
(0.021) (0.022) (0.025) (0.025) (0.076) (0.072) 
ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL OUT 
0.008 0.009 0.000 0.000 −0.037 −0.049 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.180) (0.189) 
ACQUIRING ACB 
0.068*** 0.073 0.089 0.093 −0.135 −0.163 
(0.059) (0.060) (0.061) (0.062) (0.153) (0.146) 
ACQUIRING OUT 
0.011 0.028 0.012 0.030 0.011 −0.027 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.075) (0.075) 
NON-MERGING ACB 
  0.030* 0.030* −0.018 −0.015 
  (0.018) (0.016) (0.067) (0.065) 
TFPQ  −0.265***  −0.265***  0.592**  (0.042)  (0.043)  (0.083) 
R-Squared 0.458 0.488 0.459 0.489 0.600 0.621 
N 1,980 1,980 1,980 1,980 1,980 1,980 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. Regressions control for lagged TFPQ or lagged change in TFPQ 
(∆TFPQ), lagged revenue, lagged capital equipment, lagged structural capital, lagged labor input, lagged materials input, lagged energy input, multi-unit 






Regression [7.1] indicates an increase in price at ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL 
ACB plants of 8.5% ( . = 0.085) significant at the 1% level. The estimated price 
increase for ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL OUT plants is close to zero and not 
significant. Equality of the coefficients is rejected at the 1% level and this holds 
across all regressions in Table 1.7, indicating that all systematic evidence of price 
increases at acquired plants is associated solely with local merger activity. 
In regression [7.2], the control for lagged TFPQ is replaced with a control for 
the concurrent change in TFPQ. The purpose of this specification is to isolate the 
gross price increase associated with horizontal merger activity holding the effect of 
increased productivity constant.1 The coefficient on the ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL 
ACB variable indicates a gross price increase of 10.5% with almost no change in the 
coefficient estimate for ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL OUT plants. As indicated by the 
coefficient on the ∆TFPQ variable, the elasticity of TFPQ with respect to price is 
−0.265 and is highly significant. Thus, while the approximately 6% increase in 
productivity from [7.6] puts some downward pressure on price, the rate at which 
productivity affects price is small enough to leave ample room for productivity and 
price increases to co-exist. 
In regressions [7.3] and [7.4], the net and gross price effects are re-estimated 
adding an additional variable representing non-merging plants located in ACBs that 
are characterized by within ACB merger activity (denoted as NON-MERGING ACB). 
Both regressions indicate a price increase of just over 3%, significant at the 10% level 
                                                 
1 In employing the change in TFPQ as a control, I am assuming that productivity is not endogenous to 
the firm’s profit maximization problem or, in other words, the only merger specific price effect on 





at NON-MERGING ACB plants. The addition of this control amplifies the estimated 
price increase associated with ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL ACB plants to 11.3% and 
13.3% respectively. Using the same net and gross specifications in regressions [7.5] 
and [7.6] indicates decreases in quantity sold of approximately −12.5% and −16% 
respectively. However, the standard errors for quantity are substantially higher than 
those for prices so that these effects are significant at the 10% and 5% levels 
individually, and I cannot reject the equivalence of the ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL 
ACB and ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL OUT coefficients. Nevertheless, estimated 
decreases in quantity are much smaller at ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL OUT plants. 
This evidence supports interpreting the price effects associated with merger 
activity as caused by market power. Acquired plants associated with local mergers 
experience large and significant increases in price and decreases in output, but 
horizontal mergers lacking a local component indicate no evidence of such effects. 
Furthermore, there are small but significant price increases at non-merging plants 
located near merging plants which suggests strategic complementarity in rival 
pricing. At this point, however, the evidence for acquiring plants is more ambiguous. 
For instance, the estimated price increases for ACQUIRING ACB plants are 
substantially larger than the price increases for ACQUIRING OUT plants and the 
coefficient estimate for ACQUIRING ACB plants in regression [7.4] approaches 
significance at the 10% level. Yet, no point estimate for acquiring plants actually 
attains significance. Table 1.8 thus provides additional analysis to help better explain 





Table 1.8 revisits the gross and net price regressions from the previous table 
replacing the control for the lagged level of revenue with a control for the lagged 
level of price. While both are controls for plant specific demand conditions, 
controlling for lagged price amounts to looking at the effects of merger activity 
holding initial price constant and thus abstracts from the role that initial prices play in 
the consequences of merger activity. 
 
Table 1.8: Results Controlling for Lagged Price 
 [8.1] [8.2] [8.3] [8.4] 
Dep. Var. PRICE PRICE PRICE PRICE 
ACQUIRED 
HORIZONTAL ACB 
0.067*** 0.080*** 0.068*** 0.083*** 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) 
ACQUIRED 
HORIZONTAL OUT 
  0.004 0.006 
  (0.029) (0.033) 
ACQUIRING ACB 
0.062* 0.076** 0.063* 0.078** 
(0.033) (0.038) (0.034) (0.039) 
ACQUIRING OUT 
  0.004 0.009 
  (0.021) (0.019) 
TFPQ  −0.157***  −0.158***  (0.028)  (0.028) 
R-Squared 0.558 0.590 0.558 0.590 
N 1,980 1,980 1,980 1,980 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
Regressions control for lagged TFPQ or lagged change in TFPQ (∆TFPQ), lagged revenue, lagged 
capital equipment, lagged structural capital, lagged labor input, lagged materials input, lagged 
energy input, multi-unit status, age, change in construction employment, population density, EA-
year interactions and include quantity weights. Standard errors are clustered by CEA. 
 
As regressions [8.1] and [8.2] indicate, adding lagged price has very 
interesting consequences relative to the results from the previous table. Although the 
estimated net and gross price effects for ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL ACB plants 
remain large and highly significant at 6.9% and 8.3% respectively, the magnitudes are 
notably smaller than in the previous table. On the other hand, the price increases for 





level so that after controlling for lagged price, the change in price estimated for 
acquiring and acquired plants converges to a very similar magnitude. Furthermore, as 
indicated by regression [8.3] and [8.4] the estimated price effects for both 
ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL OUT and ACQUIRING OUT plants are very close to 
zero. And, in all cases, I can reject the equivalence of the coefficients for both 
acquired plants and acquiring plants. As to whether the estimates from Table 1.7 or 
Table 1.8 are more useful, the answer largely depends on both the underlying 
interpretation of the results and the context in which the results are to be applied. 
Thus, in Table 1.9, I consider an analysis of initial pricing and output that is helpful 
for interpreting the pattern of the results and framing them in terms of the consumer 
welfare implications. 
 
Table 1.9: Initial Price Results 
 [9.1] [9.2] 
Dep. Var. PRICE QUANTITY 






R-Squared 0.544 0.571 
N 1,980 1,980 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
Regressions control for concurrent TFPQ, multi-unit status, age, a dummy variable for non-merging 
rivals within an ACB, EA-year interactions, and include quantity weights. Standard errors are clustered 
by CEA. Dependent variable is lagged price. 
 
Regressions [9.1] and [9.2] now apply an alternative specification where the 
dependent variables are initial price and output. Controls are limited to concurrent 
TFPQ, multi-unit status, a dummy variable for non-merging rivals within an ACB 





instructive for understanding how the results from the previous tables change when a 
control for initial price is included. Including initial price increases the precision of 
the estimates, but as a consequence of the below average initial pricing levels for 
merging plants, the coefficient estimates also fall. This effect is particularly 
pronounced for the acquired plants, which have statistically significant below average 
prices. 
To the extent that we are primarily interested in the direction of the results, 
Table 1.8 provides compelling evidence that prices increase at both acquired and 
acquiring plants involved in local mergers. However, as these estimates will 
ultimately be used as inputs in a welfare calculation, it is important to consider 
whether the price effects from Table 1.7 or Table 1.8 are more informative about the 
market power effects of mergers at acquired plants.2 Ultimately, the decision of which 
estimates to apply comes down to what one thinks to be the appropriate 
counterfactual. If one believes that prices would have risen to the average level in the 
absence of merger activity, then it is reasonable to only credit the price increases 
controlling for initial price as representative of a market power effect. On the other 
hand, to the extent that the prices charged by the ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL ACB 
plants would have remained below average in the absence of mergers and that the 
price increases are driven by market power, then the entire net price increase of 
11.3% from regression [7.3] represents a loss of consumer welfare. 
                                                 
2 As only the Table 1.8 estimates for acquiring plants are statistically significant, I use these estimates 





The notion that specific firms may play a special role in exerting downward 
pressure on prices and, thus, may be targeted for acquisition is a well-established and 
prominent concern in antitrust enforcement. The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
note that mergers may pose a particular threat to competition when they “lessen 
competition by eliminating a ‘maverick’ firm, i.e., a firm that plays a disruptive role 
in the market to the benefit of customers.” The evidence of price increases at non-
merging plants is particularly interesting in light of the low prices initially charged by 
acquired plants. Table 1.9 also presents results on initial quantity to shed additional 
light on the question of whether these results constitute evidence of the targeting of 
mavericks. Regression [9.2] indicates that the statistically significant below average 
prices at ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL ACB are accompanied by significantly above 
average output. Thus, rather than being firms temporarily experiencing a negative 
demand shock or providing a low quality product, the evidence indicates that the 
acquired plants were charging low prices to gain market share–exactly the behavior 
we would expect from maverick firms. In terms of the welfare calculations in the next 
section, I will do the analysis both ways, using the 6.9% price increase from Table 1.7 
as a conservative figure and the 11.3% price increase from Table 1.8 as a more 
aggressive estimate leaving it to the reader to decide which is more appropriate. 
However, I believe the evidence is consistent with the targeting of maverick firms and 








3.5: Temporal Variation 
 
Table 1.10 quantifies the price effects of horizontal mergers over the period 
from 1977 to 1982 versus the period from 1982 to 1992. These time periods 
correspond to CM years that conveniently line up with the promulgation of the 1982 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which marked the beginning of a period of significant 
change in antitrust regulation. By the mid-1980s, enforcement patterns indicate that 
antitrust regulators became substantially more permissive of merger activity.3 
However, for disclosure reasons, I am not able to subdivide the pooled estimates for 
within ACB mergers to compare the period from 1977 to 1982 to the period from 
1982 to 1992. Thus, for the purposes of this analysis, I extend consideration to all 
horizontal mergers which allows enough observations to examine the temporal 
variation. Fortunately, the price effects of horizontal mergers are prominent enough at 
acquired plants that I am still able to present informative results. However, price 
effects at acquiring plants become insignificant when local and non-local merger 
activity are pooled. Accordingly, I focus on the results for acquired plants in the next 
two tables. 
                                                 
3 It is beyond the scope of this paper whether policy towards horizontal mergers started changing in 
1982 following the promulgation of the 1982 Merger Guidelines or in the middle of the decade. Here, 
what is important is that there is broad evidence of a change in enforcement patterns by the mid-1980s 





Table 1.10: Pre- and Post-1982 Results 
 [10.1] [10.2] [10.3] [10.4] [10.5] [10.6] [10.7] 
Dep. Var. PRICE PRICE PRICE TFPQ TFPQ TFPQ TFPQ 
ACQUIRED ALL 
0.021   0.074***    
(0.022)   (0.022)    
ACQUIRED ALL*77–82 
−0.012   −0.042    
(0.036)   (0.041)    
ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL 
 0.082*** −0.072***  0.064*** −0.074*** 0.074*** 
 (0.019) (0.020)  (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
ACQUIRED 
HORIZONTAL*77–82 
 −0.134*** −0.121***  −0.122*** −0.124*** −0.123*** 
 (0.045) (0.047)  (0.041) (0.042) (0.040) 
ACQUIRED NON-HORIZONTAL 
  −0.079**   0.073 0.071** 
  (0.036)   (0.049) (0.036) 
ACQUIRED 
NON-HORIZONTAL*77–82 
  0.110**   −0.007  
  (0.042)   (0.054)  
R-Squared 0.448 0.459 0.465 0.616 0.613 0.617 0.617 
N 1,980 1,980 1,980 1,980 1,980 1,980 1,980 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. Regressions control for lagged TFPQ, lagged revenue, lagged 
capital equipment, lagged structural capital, lagged labor input, lagged materials input, lagged energy input, multi-unit status, age, change in construction 






In each regression in Table 1.10, interaction variables with suffix *77–82 are 
added to the treatment variables of interest. These variables indicate the interaction 
between the treatment variable and the period from 1977–1982. Accordingly, the 
coefficient on the ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL variable now reflects the change in 
price at horizontally acquired plants for the period from 1982 to 1992. The effect for 
the period from 1977 to 1982 is then given by the addition of the coefficients on the 
ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL and the ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL*77–82 variables. 
Regression [10.1] indicates that when I examine price changes for all acquired plants 
regardless of the type of merger (indicated by the variable ACQUIRED ALL), there 
are no significant price effects for either time period. However, the results change 
dramatically as soon as attention is restricted to horizontally acquired plants in 
regression [10.2]. For the period from 1982 to 1992, the estimated price increase is 
8.5% and is highly significant. The estimate for the period from 1977 to 1982 is 
negative but not significant, and the difference between the estimated effects for 1977 
to 1982 versus 1982 to 1992 is significant at the 1% level. 
Regression [10.3] builds on [10.2] by adding a direct comparison of non-
horizontal acquired plants before and after 1982. While the coefficient estimates for 
horizontally acquired plants remain similar to the previous regression, the results for 
non-horizontal acquisitions display the opposite pattern. Over the period from 1982 
to 1992, ACQUIRED NON-HORIZONTAL plants are associated with an almost 8% 
decline in prices significant at the 5% level. These results provide additional evidence 
that the observed pattern of price increases are the result of market power. Not only is 





only after the relaxation of antitrust in the mid-1980s, but, in addition, non-horizontal 
mergers are actually associated with price decreases emphasizing that a force unique 
to horizontal mergers is driving the observed effects. 
As indicated by regressions [10.4]–[10.7], the pattern of results is quite 
different when changes in productivity are considered. Regression [10.4] indicates 
that the ACQUIRED ALL plants are associated with highly significant increases in 
productivity over the period from 1982 to 1992 and the effect remains of a similar 
magnitude when attention is restricted to horizontal acquisitions in regression [10.5]. 
Regression [10.6] indicates that for the period from 1982 to 1992 productivity 
increases at ACQUIRED NON-HORIZONTAL plants have almost exactly the exact 
same coefficient estimate as ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL plants, but that the estimate 
falls just below the level of statistically significance. However, as indicated by the 
ACQUIRED NON-HORIZONTAL interaction term, the difference in the coefficient 
estimate for non-horizontally acquired plants is essentially zero between 1977 to 1982 
and 1982 to 1992. Thus, in regression [A7.7] the ACQUIRED NON-HORIZONTAL 
variable is pooled and now indicates a statistically significant increase in productivity 
of almost exactly the same magnitude as the effect at horizontally acquired plants 
from 1982 to 1992. Interestingly, the estimated effects for horizontally acquired 
plants are negative and insignificant across the board for the period from 1977 
to 1982, suggesting that, at least for ready-mix concrete, it is difficult from a 






Given that much of this section has focused on the market power 
interpretation of the price effects, I now consider the question of what underlying 
forces drive my productivity results. Three findings in particular provide strong 
evidence in support of a mechanism where productivity increases as productive assets 
are put in the hands of more capable managers. First, before mergers, acquiring plants 
are associated with above average productivity. Second, productivity increases are 
restricted to acquired plants, and third, the estimated productivity effects are similar 
for plants engaged in horizontal mergers versus non-horizontal mergers. Thus, the 
fundamental mechanism driving productivity increases appears to be one where more 
productive managers take less productive assets and raise them to a level of 
productivity commensurate with their own. What is important from a productivity 
perspective is not whether a merger is horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate but the 
new management’s ability to identify opportunities to reallocate inputs to more 
productive uses. 
Further evidence for how productive efficiencies are realized in the ready-mix 
concrete industry can be gleaned by looking at the effects of local versus non-local 
merger activity using TFPQ as the dependent variable instead of price as in Table 1.7. 
The outcome of this analysis is that all evidence of productivity increases at acquired 
plants is restricted to ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL ACB plants versus ACQUIRED 
HORIZONTAL OUT plants. This result is consistent with the strategies described by 
large concrete producers. For instance, Lafarge, a large, international, publicly traded 
company explained in a 2004 SEC filing that the company aims “to place our ready-





capacity, and backup capability” (Hortaçsu and Syverson, 2007). Yet, there still 
remains the question of exactly how productivity increases are realized within local 
concrete networks. Some exploratory analysis I have performed suggests that local 
mergers increase efficiencies by reducing plant level expenditure on labor and 
equipment capital, relative to structural capital, materials, and energy, holding 
quantity effects constant. This finding suggests that an interesting path for future 
research would be to relax the constant returns to scale structure imposed on the 
production function here and consider a more flexible form that can accommodate 
these stylized facts. 
As a final analysis in this section, in Table 1.11, I examine how the results 
from Table 1.10 for mergers occurring between 1982 and 1992 vary with the timing 
of merger activity. 
 
Table 1.11: Post-1982 Merger Activity by Merger Vintage 
 [11.1] [11.2] [11.3] 
Dep. Var. PRICE PRICE TFPQ 
ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL YR1 
0.128*** 0.147*** 0.082** 
(0.035) (0.039) (0.037) 
ACQUIRING HORIZONTAL YR2–YR5 
0.061*** 0.073*** 0.056** 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.027) 
ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL*PRE 
−0.141*** −0.166*** −0.125*** 
(0.041) (0.038) (0.041) 
TFPQ  −0.268***   (0.042)  
R-Squared 0.461 0.491 0.613 
N 1,980 1,980 1,980 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
Regressions control for lagged TFPQ or lagged change in TFPQ (∆TFPQ), lagged revenue, lagged 
capital equipment, lagged structural capital, lagged labor input, lagged materials input, lagged energy 
input, multi-unit status, age, change in construction employment, population density, EA-year 






Although the CM does not indicate when mergers take place for each five-
year interval, using the LBD, I am able to identify the year in which a given merger 
was consummated. Thus, Table 1.11 compares mergers consummated in the year 
prior to a CM year to mergers consummated between years two and five. 
Regressions [11.1] and [11.2] indicate that the price effects associated with merger 
activity are largest in the first year and begin to decrease after that. In both 
regressions, I can reject the equality of the year one cohort versus the year two 
through year five cohort at the 5% level. However, after this initial drop off in the 
first year, the rate at which the price effects fall decreases and the price increases 
associated with horizontal merger activity persist over the entire five-year period. On 
the other hand, for productivity, I cannot reject the equality of the year one cohort 
versus the year two through year five cohort. These results provide further evidence 
of a market power effect as one would expect entry and expansion by existing plants 
to attenuate price increases caused by market power over time. However, the fact that 
the price increases persist for multiple years is not surprising in light of the evidence 
that non-merging plants located nearby to merging plants also raise their prices and 
evidence from Collard-Wexler (2014) suggesting substantial barriers to entry in the 









Section 4: Demand Estimation and Welfare Analysis 
 
If we accept the argument that the price effects observed above were caused 
by market power, then we can conclude that consumer welfare fell as a result of price 
increases associated with horizontal merger activity. Furthermore, the evidence of 
reductions in output indicates that the consequences were not only a transfer of 
surplus from consumers to producers but a reduction in total surplus as a result of 
deadweight loss. In general, evidence that mergers will lead to price increases and 
decreases in output is sufficient for the regulatory authorities to block a merger as the 
consumer welfare impact is usually the focus of regulatory concern. However, as 
illustrated by Williamson (1968) when mergers create efficiencies that reduce 
marginal cost, net total welfare may increase even when mergers engender 
deadweight loss. 
Thus, in the section I consider whether there is any compelling evidence that 
total welfare increased, despite the price and output effects associated with the 
mergers in my sample. To do so, I proceed in three steps. First I estimate a simple 
aggregate data multinomial logit model with unobserved product characteristics 
following Berry (1994) to model demand. Second, I estimate plant’s marginal costs 
using the firm’s first order conditions. Third, I use my estimates from the previous 
section to simulate counterfactual levels of price and marginal cost in the absence of 
the market power and efficiency effects created by mergers. 
As is standard, it is assumed that there are = 0,1, … ,  products in 
= 1, … ,  markets each with = 1, … ,  consumers. The key step in implementing 





mix concrete industry by defining each plant as a separate product. Thus, products 
= 1, … ,  represent competing differentiated ready-mix concrete options 
corresponding to each plant in a market. The alternative zero, represents an outside 
option corresponding to not purchasing any of the  products. Markets are defined as 
CEA-year combinations of size  and are observed at five-year intervals. To further 
account for the fact that some plants are located in superior locations, the non-random 
portion of utility is determined by a plant level fixed effect  and the price charged 
by the plant . Indirect utility for consumer  is: 
 = − + + = +  (5) 
where  represents unobserved differences in product quality, and  is a stochastic 
error term. As from today/’s standard policy perspective, the evidence from the 
previous section would generally be sufficient to label the observed mergers as 
anticompetitive, in this section I proceed by making assumptions that are designed to 
give the efficiencies the benefit of the doubt in reversing the welfare losses associated 
with market power effects. Thus, first and foremost, I will assume that all increases in 
productivity are fully dual to marginal cost, i.e., that none of the efficiencies 
measured in the previous section represent fixed costs. Second, as will be discussed in 
more detail below, I will use merger simulation and my estimates from the previous 
suggestion to suggest a procedure for constraining the market size . 
Estimating  from the equation above is the critical step for calculating 
consumer welfare in the multinomial logit model. For products = 1, … ,  the market 
share  is calculated based on the amount of concrete sold (in cubic yards) relative 





Assuming that  is IID according to the Type I extreme value distribution gives rise 




  . (6) 
From this step, one might be inclined to estimate  directly using a procedure 
like non-linear least squares, but since unobserved quality will likely be correlated 
with price, this approach is problematic. To deal with this endogeneity, Berry (1994) 
inverts the equation above so that  can be estimated from the linear equation: 
 ln − ln( ) = − +  (7) 
using two-stage least squares. Following Foster et al. (2008), I use ln  as an 
instrument and also control for CEA-level average income and year effects in 
estimating the equation above. 
The final step necessary to estimate  is to set the market size  so that I can 
calculate shares. However, there is no direct way to calculate the market size in the 
concrete industry taking into account the potential role of substitution to materials 
like steel and asphalt which anecdotal evidence suggests can be substantial depending 
on concrete prices.1 One methodology would be to simply take the quantity of 
concrete sold in each market and assume a fixed percentage of the outside good. This 
approach however has the disadvantage of being completely arbitrary in defining the 
share of the outside good and in not allowing any variation in substitution patterns by 
market. Another approach that creates more variation is taking the maximum value of 
                                                 
1 For instance, a 1988 article in the New York Times real estate section entitled “Concrete or Steel?” 





concrete sold in each market across time and then specifying a fixed percentage of the 
outside share for the maximal market-year observation. However, this still involves 
an undesirable degree of arbitrariness. 
The good news is that employing these strategies over a broad range of 
specified shares leads to quite similar elasticity estimates. However, as the market 
size gets larger, the level of the estimated consumer surplus loss increases 
substantially. Since the main point of this section is to give efficiencies the benefit of 
the doubt, this is potentially problematic. Thus, my preferred approach involves 
modifying the second methodology so that the market size for the maximal market-
year across each market is set by matching the reduced-form estimates from the 
previous section to the predicted price outcomes from simulating the mergers that 
occur in my sample based on their pre-merger characteristics.2 Specifically, I begin 
by setting the share of the outside good in each of the maximal market-year 
observations to 50%.3 Specifying the share of the outside good at this level in 
maximal market-year observations leads to predicted merger price effects that are far 
below the levels estimated in the previous section. Thus, I proceed by reducing the 
share of the outside good uniformly, until the average price increase at acquired 
plants matches the 11.3% price increase from Table 1.7. Here, I choose the larger 
predicted value between Tables 1.7 and 1.8 so that the market size is smaller and the 
estimated consumer surplus levels are conservative. 
                                                 
2 Simulation is necessarily restricted to mergers that involve a within CEA change in market structure. 
 
3 Thus, for a given market in the non-maximal year, the share of the outside good will necessarily be 





With the size of the market fixed, demand estimation follows as described 
above. Table 1.12 presents the results. 
 
Table 1.12: Demand Estimation Results 
N 
Average Share 





Table 1.12 indicates that the results of this estimation procedure are quite 
reasonable. The average share of the outside both indicates the relative importance of 
concrete as a building material, while still allowing for substitution to alternative 
construction materials like steel or asphalt. Given the structure of the model, elasticity 
of demand for each plant is given by the formula = − (1 − ). It is 
interesting and reassuring to note that the average elasticity estimated here is very 
similar to the elasticity of demand estimated using constant elasticity model from 
Foster et al. (2008). 
On the supply side, I estimate each plant’s marginal cost which is necessary to 
simulate the producer surplus effects of the observed mergers. Firms set plant level 
prices by maximizing the firm’s profit across all of the plants in a given CEA. For a 
given plant  at time , this gives rise to the first order condition: 
 
( ) + ( − )
∈
( )
= 0 (8) 






with the firm. By defining the matrix Ω such that  Ω ( ) = − ( )/  
if ∃ : { , } ⊂  and zero otherwise, the J first order conditions for a market can be 
written in vector notation as 
 ( ) − Ω( )( − ) = 0 (9) 
so that marginal cost for each plant is given by 
 = − Ω( ) ( ) . (10) 
Using this procedure, the estimated average marginal cost is $34.10 (1.25) per 
cubic yard. 
With these estimates, I now proceed to calculating the welfare affects for a 
given set of counterfactual prices and marginal costs. With this structure, following 
Small and Rosen (1981), the change in consumer surplus is given by applying the 
“logsum” formula: 
 
∆ = ln − ln   (11) 
where  represents the counterfactual product-level component of utility. The key 
step here is to use my estimates from the previous section to set the level of prices 
that would have prevailed in the absence of the market power created by merger 
activity. Specifically, for each plant engaged in a within ACB merger, I reduce prices 
by the percentage indicated by my regression results. 
I then calculate the change in marginal cost using my TFPQ estimates an 
exploiting the duality of this relationship with marginal cost. This change is 






gain in producer surplus. The change in welfare is then given by: 
 ∆ = ∆ + ∆  . (12) 
The welfare simulation results are summarized in Table 1.13. 
 
Table 1.13: Welfare Simulation Results (1987 Dollars, Millions) 
Price Effect PS Gain CS Loss ACB 
acquired: 6.9% 















The first row in Table 1.13 considers the tradeoff at acquired plants using the 
price increase for acquired plants from regression [8.1] which controls for lagged 
initial price. This specification is conservative in that it assumes that below average 
prices at acquired plants would have rebounded to the average level in the absence of 
merger activity. In essence, this approach abstracts from any maverick firm effect as 
discussed in the previous section. The results from the first row indicate that although 
the percentage price increase is larger than the percentage increase in productivity, 
the producer surplus gain outweighs the loss of consumer surplus so that net welfare 
increases slightly. On the other hand, if the full 11.3% price increase associated with 





loss at acquired plants. Overall, I infer from these results that the producer surplus 
gains and consumer surplus losses at acquired plants essentially cancel out. However, 
when price increases at acquiring plants and non-merging plants are taken into 
account, the loss of consumer surplus increases dramatically to approximately $170 
million (1987 dollars) so that there is a net welfare loss of approximately $30 million. 
To put the consumer surplus loss in perspective, this figure represents about 4% of 
commerce in ready-mix concrete markets affected by the horizontal mergers in my 
sample. 
 
Section 5: Conclusion 
 
 
Overall, my results suggest price increases of about 7% to 11% at acquired 
plants associated with local merger activity accompanied by productivity increases of 
about 6%. Controlling for changes in productivity yields an estimated gross market 
power effect of between approximately 8.5% and 13%. The estimated price increase 
at acquiring plants associated with local merger activity is over 6%, and the estimated 
price increased at non-merging plants located in close proximity to merging plants is 
approximately 3%. Examining price effects for the set of all horizontally acquired 
plants before and after 1982 indicates no evidence of price increases for the period 
from 1977 to 1982, but price increases of approximately 8% for the period from 1982 
to 1992. This large increase is in stark contrast to the approximately −7.5% decrease 





no evidence of productivity increases at horizontally acquired plants over the period 
from 1977 to 1982, but the estimated productivity increase is over 7% for the period 
from 1982 to 1992. Unlike the pattern for prices, the estimated productivity increase 
for non-horizontally acquired plants of around 7% is of a very similar magnitude to 
the effect for horizontally acquired plants. 
As far as productivity is concerned, this is one of the first studies to 
distinguish the productivity effects of horizontal mergers from other types of mergers. 
The similarity of the productivity results across merger types provides new support 
for the growing literature that emphasizes the potential for mergers to reallocate 
productive assets from lower value to higher value uses (Hortaçsu and 
Syverson, 2007; Braguinsky et al., 2015). This reallocation and convergence 
mechanism is supported by the evidence I present indicating that acquiring plants 
have above average initial productivity and productivity increases are restricted to 
acquired plants. Overall, the results suggest a story where sophisticated managers 
bring their expertise to less sophisticated operations increasing productivity. 
Furthermore, the concentration of productivity effects in local markets suggests that 
the gains are ultimately realized through improved coordination of logistics between 
plants. In future research, it would be particularly interesting to better under- stand 
how these efficiencies are realized in terms of observable plant level behavior. Some 
initial exploration of the data suggests the highly interesting possibility that 
efficiencies are realized by reducing relative expenditure on labor and equipment 






These productivity increases at acquired plants are also accompanied by large 
price increases. Although increased productivity exerts significant downward 
pressure on prices, the rate at which productivity increases reduce prices is modest, 
leaving room for the creation of additional market power. Unlike productivity, price 
increases are not limited to acquired plants but are also observed at acquiring and 
non-merging plants located near horizontally merging plants. 
The evidence strongly suggests that these price increases are the result of 
market power. Price increases are associated solely with mergers involving plants in 
close geographic proximity, only with horizontal mergers, and only after the 
relaxation of antitrust standards in the mid-1980s. Furthermore, there is evidence that 
when firms pursue mergers of plants in close proximity, they target firms charging 
below average prices. To the extent that in the absence of mergers, these plants would 
have continued to charge low prices putting downward pressure on the prevailing 
price level, these results may indicate that acquirers targeted maverick firms. Concern 
over the acquisition of maverick firms has long been a facet of the antitrust review 
process at agencies like the DOJ and the FTC, but the horizontal merger retrospective 
literature evidence has devoted little attention to this issue. 
While the regression results strongly suggest consumer surplus declined as a 
result of horizontal merger activity, quantifying the total welfare affect requires 
considering the tradeoff between the producer surplus increasing effect of enhanced 
productivity and the consumer surplus decreasing effect of higher prices. My 
simulation results suggest while these effects essentially cancel out at acquired plants, 





total welfare as a result of horizontal merger activity. Furthermore, while the total 
welfare effect at acquired plants is minimal, my results also suggest that for 
productivity increases to offset price increases entirely at acquired plants would 
require extremely large productivity increases on the order of 30%. In addition, while 
there is some attenuation of the price increases over time, my results indicate that 
price increases persist alongside productivity increases as long as five years after the 
consummation of mergers and beyond. Thus, increases in efficiencies and the 
operation of market forces were not ultimately sufficient to ameliorate the welfare 












Section 1: Introduction 
 
In this article, we introduce a model of anticompetitive exclusive dealing that 
provides a unified treatment of two of the major categories of potentially 
anticompetitive single-firm conduct recognized by the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC): refusal to deal and exclusive purchase agreements. The FTC 
defines exclusive purchase agreements as contracts “requiring a dealer to sell [the] 
products of only one manufacturer.” Contracts of this sort have long been the focus of 
the Naked Exclusion literature (Rasmusen et al., 1991; Segal and Whinston, 2000; 
Fumagalli and Motta, 2006; Simpson and Wickelgren, 2007; Abito and Wright, 2008; 
DeGraba, 2013), a family of models which serve as the primary applied theoretical 
framework for the economic evaluation of exclusive dealing cases. The basic 
structure of the model as introduced by Rasmusen et al. (1991) and Segal and 
Whinston (2000) [hereafter RRW-SW] revolves around the behavior of three sets of 
agents, an incumbent, a potential rival, and  downstream buyers. Exclusive 
contracts are defined in terms of a commitment by downstream buyers to purchase 
only from the incumbent and are enforced through an external mechanism (i.e., the 
legal system). The success of this literature lies in its simple description of equilibria 
where the incumbent can use exclusive contracts with lump-sum compensation to 





However, many important exclusive dealing cases involve fact patterns that 
do not fit neatly into existing Naked Exclusion models. For instance, many exclusive 
dealing cases involve accusations that competitive pressures created by the exclusive 
contracts force buyers to agree to exclusive contracts to their own detriment; many 
cases also do not involve any compensation of buyers. Yet, as we discuss in Section 2 
of this article, the exclusionary equilibria predicted by the Naked Exclusion literature 
provide scant economic foundation for exclusive dealing cases characterized by these 
fact patterns. 
Furthermore, many exclusive dealing cases involve contractual arrangements 
that are not consistent with the externally enforced buyer commitment contracts 
assumed in the literature. Rather, many of the most salient antitrust cases involve 
exclusive contracts that commit the seller to dealing only with buyers who purchase 
from the seller. One very prominent case that manifests all three of these 
characteristics is United States v. Dentsply International, Inc. (2005). Dentsply, a 
producer of artificial teeth, imposed a contractual term on distributors of its product 
known as “Dealer Criterion 6” which stipulated that in order to sell Dentsply 
products, dealers had to agree not to offer the products of competing manufacturers. 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Dentsply suggests that the distributors 
agreed to the contracts despite being dissatisfied with the terms, were driven to 
acquiescing by competitive pressures, and were not provided compensation despite 
being made worse off by the contracts. Consequently, despite its legal importance, 





Our approach to providing a firm economic foundation for cases like Dentsply 
is inspired by a theory of anticompetitive single-firm conduct known as a “refusal to 
deal.” The FTC explains that in the context of exclusive dealing, the essence of a 
refusal to deal is a situation where the predatory firm imposes the condition, “I refuse 
to deal with you if you deal with my competitor.” In Section 3 of this paper, we 
introduce a simple “Refusal to Deal Game” inspired by the seminal Supreme Court 
case Lorain Journal v. United States (1951). In Lorain Journal, the Supreme Court 
found that Lorain Journal, a local newspaper, prevented businesses who wanted to 
advertise on a new radio station from doing so by demanding exclusivity. Lorain 
Journal enforced its policy of exclusivity by refusing to let any business advertising 
on the radio station advertise in the newspaper. 
Like the Naked Exclusion literature, we show that our simple model exhibits 
equilibria where the predatory firm (the incumbent) successfully prevents the rival 
from entering, allowing the incumbent to monopolize the upstream market and 
equilibria where the rival enters and competition prevails. Unlike the Naked 
Exclusion literature, however, we show that the exclusionary outcome, is a robust 
outcome of the game even in the absence of any compensation of the buyers. 
Furthermore, in applying a weak-dominance equilibrium refinement to isolate 
exclusion as the unique outcome, we identify a mechanism that demonstrates how the 
refusal to deal creates an environment where competitive pressures push the 
downstream buyers to capitulate. Specifically, when buyers are pivotal their incentive 





excluded from the downstream market. Yet, because all buyers go along with the 
scheme, no buyer is pivotal and all buyers are strictly worse off. 
In Section 4, we embed the simple Refusal to Deal Game into a Naked 
Exclusion model following the structure of Simpson and Wickelgren (2007). The key 
step in adapting our model to this setting involves defining exclusive contracts in 
terms of a seller commitment by the incumbent only to deal with downstream buyers 
who do not enter into exclusive purchase agreements with the rival. This is an 
alternative to the buyer commitment assumption that is employed in the Naked 
Exclusion literature (Elhauge and Wickelgren, 2012). 
The Naked Exclusion structure also places more restrictions on the model 
relative to the simple Refusal to Deal Game and in many cases the additional 
structure may be more realistic. With this structure, the exclusionary outcome can still 
be isolated as the unique outcome by requiring that equilibria be perfectly coalition-
proof. Although this equilibrium refinement is weaker, we show that the mechanism 
by which the exclusionary scheme prevents the downstream buyers from coordinating 
on their preferred equilibrium is fundamentally similar to the mechanism from 
Section 3 with pivotal coalitions of buyers taking the place of pivotal buyers. Finally, 
in Section 5 we compare the results of our model to results from the Naked Exclusion 
literature and consider the implications of our results for a number of issues in 
antitrust economics and jurisprudence.  
In addition to providing a framework for understanding prominent cases like 
Dentsply and Lorain Journal, our approach provides an economic rationale for a 





Transitions Optical, Inc. (2010) and In the Matter of IDEXX Laboratories, Inc. 
(2013).1 Although the full details have not yet become public, the preliminary 
allegations suggest that our model may also be applicable to U.S. Justice 
Department’s recently announced investigation of potential exclusion of craft brewers 
by AB InBev.2 
 
Section 2: The Naked Exclusion Literature 
 
Naked Exclusion models revolve around the behavior of three sets of agents, 
an incumbent, a potential rival, and  downstream buyers which purchase a 
necessary input from the upstream suppliers. The game proceeds over three periods. 
In period 1, the incumbent offers buyers exclusive contracts. The exclusive contracts 
are defined as a commitment by the buyer to purchase from the incumbent in return 
for a specified level of lump-sum compensation. Typically, the literature assumes that 
once a buyer signs such an agreement it must purchase only from the incumbent. 
However, as we will discuss below, Simpson and Wickelgreen (2007) consider 
contracts enforced through breach damages rather than an absolute commitment to 
buy from the incumbent enforced by an institution with the power to compel 
                                                 
1 The need to clarify the relationship between cases involving an exclusionary strategy predicated on 
seller commitment and the exclusive dealing models currently considered as part of the Naked 
Exclusion literature is longstanding. Indeed, RRW cite Lorain Journal as one of the cases motivating 
the very first Naked Exclusion model. 
 
2 On October 12, 2015, the Washington Post reported, “Antitrust regulators are also reviewing craft 
brewers’ claims that AB InBev pushes some independent distributors to carry only the company’s 





purchases.3 In period 2, the rival decides whether to enter. In period 3, prices are set 
and purchases are realized. 
In the RRW-SW model, the rival has a cost function (∙) where ( ) =  for 
≥ ∗ and  ( ) >  at all < ∗.4 The incumbent has a constant marginal cost 
( ) =  so that if the rival reaches the minimum efficient scale it is an equally 
efficient competitor.5 The exclusionary equilibria arising from the RRW-SW model 
and the related models of Fumagalli and Motta (2006),  Simpson and 
Wickelgren (2007)6 and Asker and Bar-Isaac (2014)7 can be organized into four 
categories based on the compensation strategy employed by the incumbent, the 
specification of the buyers as independent purchasers or firms competing in a 
downstream market, and the payoffs realized by the buyers: 
(i) The buyers are either independent purchasers or firms, and a pivotal 
segment of the downstream market is fully compensated for agreeing to the exclusive 
                                                 
3 Simpson and Wickelgren’s model is predicated on the observation that courts in the United States do 
not enforce contracts by forcing or compelling specific behavior, but rather, as will be discussed more 
below, through damages. 
 
4 While other papers in the literature implement alternative cost assumptions, we introduce the original 
RRW-SW cost structure as it will play an important role in Sections 3 and 4. Note, however, we have 
modified it slightly so that all that is required is that the rival’s marginal cost is strictly greater than ̅ 
below the minimum efficient scale. 
 
5 The results for the model in Section 4 can accommodate a more efficient rival, however, the results 
for the model in Section 3 will only hold up to an equally-efficient competitor. 
 
6 Fumagalli and Motta make assumptions that end up ruling out the exclusionary equilibria of their 
model, but Simpson and Wickelgren show that their model accommodates exclusionary outcomes as 
well. Because of their article’s important role in considering downstream buyers as firms competing in 
terms of perfect substitutes, we include the article here despite their conclusion ultimately ruling out 
exclusion. 
 
7 Asker and Bar-Isaac considers the potential for exclusionary resale price maintenance rather than 
anticompetitive exclusive contracts. However, in the perfect competition setting they show that resale 
price maintenance can drive monopolization through a mechanism similar to the exclusive contracts 
from the Naked Exclusion literature. Their results help to clarify the potential for compensated 





contracts. The remainder of the participants in the downstream market receive no 
compensation and are strictly worse off as they receive the input at the monopoly 
price. 
(ii) The buyers are firms who compete with each other in the downstream 
market. Downstream competition is sufficiently strong so that the incumbent can 
afford to compensate all of the downstream firms for agreeing to the exclusive 
contracts without spending more than the total monopoly surplus. The downstream 
firms suffer no harm and all of the loss of surplus is suffered by the end users who 
purchase from the downstream firms. Included in this case is the specification where 
the downstream firms compete in terms of perfect substitutes and the incumbent can 
monopolize the market providing no compensation, as the downstream firms are 
indifferent between monopoly and competition in the upstream market.   
(iii) The buyers are either independent purchasers or firms who compete in 
terms of imperfect substitutes. All buyers receive zero compensation for agreeing to 
the exclusive contracts but fail to coordinate on their preferred equilibrium. All 
buyers are worse off, but this anticompetitive equilibrium is weakly dominated. There 
is also always an equilibrium where the rival successfully enters the market and 
competition prevails.  
(iv) The buyers are either independent purchasers or firms. The buyers receive 
positive compensation for agreeing to the exclusive contracts but still fail to 
coordinate on their preferred equilibrium as no buyer receives compensation 
sufficient to make up for the loss of surplus resulting from monopoly pricing. All 





coalition-proof Nash equilibrium refinement. Again, there is also always an 
equilibrium where the rival successfully enters and this equilibrium survives the 
coalitional refinement.  
This taxonomy of results gives rise to three observations. First, case (iii) 
indicates that the Naked Exclusion literature provides little theoretical support for the 
possibility of uncompensated exclusive dealing outside of a downstream market 
characterized by perfect competition.8 Indeed, when uncompensated monopolization 
occurs in the context of perfect competition, the downstream buyers are not rendered 
strictly worse off as they are indifferent between either outcome. Second, in the most 
robust cases, (i) and (ii), successful monopolization essentially turns all or some 
portion of downstream buyers into accomplices rather than victims of the 
anticompetitive scheme. Third, for cases (iii) or (iv) there is no mechanism suggesting 
how or why the buyers fail to coordinate on their preferred equilibrium. Indeed, 
applying simple Nash equilibrium refinements in both cases illustrates specific 
rationales for why the competitive equilibrium is likely to succeed rather than the 
anticompetitive equilibrium. As discussed above, the absence of both a justification 
for exclusive dealing cases involving no compensation of buyers and, more generally, 
the absence of a mechanism indicating how exclusion succeeds in the absence of full 
compensation is problematic as it places a number of the most significant antitrust 
cases outside of the ambit of the Naked Exclusion literature.  
                                                 
8 The case of perfect substitutes in the downstream market is likely to be of little relevance in real-





Another aspect of the Naked Exclusion literature that is potentially 
problematic from the perspective of real-world antitrust analysis is the way in which 
the buyer-committing exclusive contracts are typically defined. Simpson and 
Wickelgren (2007) observe that although the Naked Exclusion literature assumes that 
once buyers sign an exclusive contract they have no choice but to purchase under the 
contract, this is not consistent with the legal treatment of contracts. Rather, they note 
that contracts are enforced through the imposition of breach damages by courts 
against parties that fail to perform their contractual obligations. Simpson and 
Wickelgren modify the basic structure of the RRW-SW model to allow for breach 
damages by splitting period 3 into three sub-periods. In period 3.1, prices are set. In 
period 3.2, the downstream buyers, which are specified as firms in competition with 
one another, decide whether to breach or maintain their contract with the incumbent. 
Finally, in period 3.3, sales are realized and breach damages are assessed. 
The Simpson and Wickelgren model implicitly assumes that purchases from 
the rival require a forward purchase arrangement. Otherwise, breach could simply 
occur in period 3.2 with a downstream firm choosing to purchase from the rival.  
Thus, the effect of including breach damages in the model is to impose a cost on 
buyers transitioning from a purchasing arrangement with the incumbent to a 
purchasing arrangement with the rival. Using this structure, they show that when 
breach damages are set at or below the level of expectation damages,9 the penalty 
under common law, the prediction of the model ceases to be monopolization through 
                                                 
9 Expectation damages are damages paid by the breaching party to the injured party that place the 






rival exclusion.10 Instead, the incumbent firm maintains monopoly profits by allowing 
the rival to enter and collecting damages from downstream firms breaching the 
contracts.  
While the Simpson and Wickelgren model addresses some potentially 
unrealistic aspects of the basic Naked Exclusion structure, it too has important 
limitations as a model of real world antitrust cases. Exclusion or impairment of rivals 
is at the heart of most major antitrust cases involving exclusive dealing and the 
absence of a compelling and general explanation for this phenomenon would be 
problematic for a literature predicated on understanding anticompetitive exclusive 
dealing. Furthermore, antitrust cases where contracts are enforced through breach 
damages are certainly far less common than strategies involving punishment or 
discounts. Thus, in developing our model of exclusive dealing we will focus on 
strategic or contractual arrangements that are observed in real-world antitrust cases 
while still taking advantage of simple structure and appealing characteristics of 





                                                 
10 If breach damages are specified above the level of expectation damages, then the model will provide 
the same exclusionary outcome as in RRW-SW. However, Simpson and Wickelgren argue that this 
will not generally apply. Furthermore, when breach damages are set exactly equal to expectation 
damages, both the exclusionary RRW-SW result and the breach result are possible equilibria. They 
rule out the exclusionary equilibrium assuming that a downstream firm will choose to breach when 
indifferent. However, another way to arrive at this conclusion is to assume that legal action on the part 
of the incumbent has a small non-recoverable cost. This assumption is quite plausible given the costs 
and uncertainty associated with litigation. Either way, their model suggests important limitations on 





Section 3: A Simple Refusal to Deal Game 
 
In this section, we introduce a simple “Refusal to Deal Game” which models 
anticompetitive exclusive dealing using Lorain Journal as inspiration. Specifically, 
we build the model around three features that are motivated as stylized 
representations of the fact pattern associated with the case.11 First, as Lorain Journal 
did not involve explicit exclusive purchase contracts, the refusal to deal is imposed on 
the downstream market without a bargaining process in period 1. Second, as the only 
lever used by Lorain Journal to enforce compliance was access to its advertising 
platform, we assume that downstream firms are free to purchase from the rival at any 
time if it is active in the upstream market. Third, we specify that the refusal to deal is 
activated by any agreement a downstream enters to purchase from the rival.12 In the 
next section, we adapt this simple model into the more structured setting of the Naked 
Exclusion model. Consequently, we maintain their convention of labeling period 3 in 
terms of three sub-periods.  
As in the Naked Exclusion literature, the model involves an incumbent, a 
potential rival, and N buyers who we specify as firms competing in a downstream 
market. The incumbent and the rival produce a homogenous product that is essential 
for production of the downstream good. The downstream firms compete in a market 
                                                 
11 Our assessment of the circumstances of the case are based on the description provided by the 
Supreme Court. 
 
12 The court records in cases involving exclusionary conduct of this nature frequently indicate that 
simply contacting or entering into an initial agreement with a rival is often sufficient to cause an 
incumbent to activate a refusal to deal. For instance, in Lorain Journal, the Supreme Court noted that 
mere suspicion of an agreement to advertise on radio was sufficient to trigger the refusal to deal. In 
Dentsply, when Trinity Dental entered into an agreement to sell another competitor’s teeth, Dentsply 





characterized by competition in Bertrand differentiated products. One of the primary 
factors that drives our model is the production technology, which is adapted from 
RRW-SW. As described above, the rival has a cost function (∙) where ( ) =  for 
≥ ∗ and  ( ) >  at all < ∗ and the incumbent has a constant marginal cost 
( ) = . We assume where useful the existence of a sufficiently fine discrete price 
space to address open set problems. We also assume that the rival never needs to sell 
to the entire market in order to reach the minimum efficient scale. The timing of the 
game is as follows: 
In period 1, the incumbent commits to a refusal to deal.  
In period 2, the rival decides whether to enter. 
In period 3.1, the incumbent and the rival set prices  and , respectively. 
In period 3.2, the rival takes orders to determine if it will reach the minimum 
efficient scale. The results of this model turn on how we specify what happens when 
the rival does not reach the minimum scale. By placing an order at this stage with the 
rival, a downstream firm is prevented from purchasing from the incumbent at any 
remaining point in the game as a result of the refusal to deal. Consequently, whether 
the rival reaches the minimum efficient scale is determined by the number of firms 
who place orders with the rival.13 If the rival does not reach the minimum efficient 
scale and is not able to profitably honor the price set in period 3.1 the rival declares 
bankruptcy, exits the upstream market, and incurs a small exit cost. Let  represent 
                                                 
13 There are however no similar limitations in this section on the purchasing behavior of firms that do 
not place orders with the rival. Thus. for simplicity, we assume that those firms which do not place 
orders with the rival will purchase from the incumbent unless the price offered by the rival is superior 
to that offered by the incumbent. As a result, the number of firms placing orders with the rival is 





the number of downstream firms that place orders with the rival and are thus subject 
to the refusal to deal and let  represent the number of downstream firms who remain 
eligible to purchase from the incumbent. Let ℛ and ℐ represent the respective sets 
associated with  and . 
In period 3.3, if the rival reaches scale, competition proceeds at the prices 
declared in period 3.1. If not and the rival exits, the downstream firms that placed 
orders with the rival are now excluded from the downstream market as they cannot 
gain access to the necessary input.14 For the remainder of this section we also assume 
that if the rival does reach the minimum scale, the downstream firms in ℐ remain free 
to purchase from the rival. 
 
Lemma 1: If = = ̅, there exists a number ∗ such that the rival reaches the 
minimum efficient scale if and only if > − ∗. 
Proof: 
Let  represent the size of the market when all of the downstream firms 
purchase the input at a price of  so that each downstream firm purchases  
= =  units and the rival’s quantity supplied can be written as = ( − ) . 
The rival reaches the minimum efficient scale if and only if ≥ ∗. Thus, the 
expression ∗ = −  implicitly defines a real number  such that the rival 
reaches the minimum efficient scale if and only if ≤ . For a real number , let [ ] 
                                                 
14 As will become clear from the results below, we need not specify what happens if the rival does not 
meet the minimum scale but remains in the market as the rival must set a price equal to marginal cost 





represent the closest integer greater than . By rearranging the expression above, we 
have = −
∗
. Letting ∗ = −
∗
 we have that the rival reaches the minimum 
efficient if and only if < ∗.15 Note that + =  so we can rewrite the condition 
as − < ∗. Rearranging we have that the rival reaches the minimum efficient 
scale if and only if > − ∗. ■ 
 
Lemma 2: The rival must set = ̅ to make any sales in an equilibrium of the 
subgame beginning in period 3.1. 
Proof: 
Suppose that the rival sets > ̅. If <  the rival makes no sales. If the 
incumbent sets ≥ , the incumbent will deviate so that = −  and sell to the 
entire market unless at =  the incumbent already sells to the entire market. ■ 
 
For the sake of simplicity, we will remove from consideration any pricing 
equilibrium in the subgame beginning in period 3.1 where either the incumbent or the 
rival cannot make any sales at the set prices no matter what transpires in the 
remainder of the game.  Consequently, we assume without any loss of generality that 
the rival sets = ̅ throughout the remainder of the analysis. 
For the next lemma, we define ̅ as the price such that if = ̅, for any  
≥ ̅ a single downstream firm placing an order from the rival is sufficient for the 
                                                 
15 A similar condition is applied, but not formally derived in RRW-SW. An implicit assumption in both 
papers is that  is not integer valued so that the strict inequality holds after applying the function 





rival to reach the minimum efficient scale.16 At this point it is also useful to introduce 
the following notation. Let  represent the profits of a downstream firm and let  
represent the vector with  elements where each element has the identical value . 
Then ( , ) represents the profits of a buyer who receives the input at price p 
while the other − 1 firms also receive the input at price . Furthermore, 
( , ∗ ) represents the profits of a buyer who receives the input at  while only 
∗ − 1 firms receive the input at  and the remaining firms are excluded from the 
market.  
 
Lemma 3: Equilibrium in the subgame beginning in period 3.1 following rival entry 
can take any form where = ̅, ̅ ≤ < ̅. Furthermore, given any equilibrium 
pricing pair ( , ), there is an equilibrium where the rival achieves the minimum 
efficient scale and an equilibrium where the rival does not achieve the minimum scale 
and is forced to exit. 
Proof:  
If ≥ ̅, then the incumbent must achieve =  in period 3.2 to prevent the 
rival from reaching minimum scale and deviation by a single firm to purchasing from 
the rival is sufficient to render the rival viable. Since , > ( , ), such 
a deviation is optimal for a downstream firm, demonstrating that we can rule out  
≥ ̅ as the incumbent will never be able to make sales at that price.17 
                                                 
16 Without loss of generality we assume throughout that ̅ < . 
 
17 The deviating firm is equally well off in the model in this section. It can still purchase from the rival 





Now, using our assumption of a discrete price space we consider ∗ < ̅ such 
that ∗ is one increment below ̅. We also suppose for ease of exposition and without 
loss of generality that ∗ is such that the rival need only secure purchase orders from 
two buyers in period 3.2 to reach the minimum efficient scale. Suppose in the 
subgame beginning in period 3.2, = . If a single downstream firm deviates, the 
rival does not achieve the minimum scale. However, the incumbent still enforces the 
refusal to deal so that the buyer is excluded from the downstream market and earns 
zero profits as opposed to ( ∗, ∗ ). Thus, =  represents an equilibrium of the 
subgame beginning in period 3.2. 
If we alternatively suppose that in the subgame beginning in period 3.2  
= , then following a deviation by a downstream firm the rival remains viable.18 
Thus, =  also represents an equilibrium of the subgame beginning in period 3.2. 
Specifying =  as the continuation equilibrium following  = ∗ in the 
subgame beginning in period 3.2 implies that  = ∗ is the only equilibrium of the 
subgame beginning in period 3.1. Any higher price would result in deviation by a 
downstream firm, successful competition from the rival, and zero profits for the 
incumbent. Thus  = ∗ and the rival exiting the upstream market is an equilibrium 
of the subgame beginning in period 3.1. 
 However, specifying =  as the continuation equilibrium following  
= ∗ in the subgame beginning in period 3.2 is also consistent with  = ∗ 
                                                 
crucial differences introduced into the model in Section 4 is that the deviating firm would now be 
strictly worse off as it would have to purchase from the incumbent at ∗. 
 
18 This follows from our assumption above that we can rule out pricing equilibria where the upstream 





representing an equilibrium in the subgame beginning in period 3.1. If, for instance, 
we specify off of the equilibrium path that all downstream firms purchase from the 
rival unless = ̅, then any pricing deviation by the incumbent in period 3.1 will 
result in zero profit, which is the same profit the incumbent earns from setting  
= ∗. Indeed, this same argument establishes any  such that ̅ ≥ ≥ ̅ can 
describe an equilibrium of the subgame beginning in period 3.1 where the rival 
achieves minimum scale and successfully competes. 
Finally, it follows that by specifying off of the equilibrium path the latter type 
of equilibrium where in period 3.2 the rival achieves the minimum efficient scale for 
any price > , any  such that ∗ > ≥ ̅ can represent an equilibrium of the 
game beginning in period 3.1 where the rival is forced to exit the market. ■  
 
Given that following the decision to enter in period 2, there are continuation 
equilibria in period 3 where the rival succeeds and continuation equilibria where the 
rival fails, the game as a whole has equilibria where the rival enters and equilibria 
where the rival does not enter. If the rival does not enter the incumbent is able to set 
= . The situation is summarized in Proposition One. 
 
Proposition 1: Play along the equilibrium path for the simple Refusal to Deal Game 
can take two forms: 
(i) the rival does not enter, = , and all downstream firms purchase from the 
incumbent. 





Just as in the original RRW-SW Naked Exclusion model there are equilibria 
of the game as a whole where the downstream firms coordinate on their preferred 
outcome and equilibria where the downstream firms fail to coordinate on their 
preferred outcome. However, as discussed above, in the RRW-SW model there is no 
mechanism to explain why in the absence of compensation the downstream firms may 
fail to coordinate. Proposition 2 suggests a specific mechanism for how exclusion 
succeeds in the absence of any compensation of buyers by the incumbent and also 
indicates that in this simple model the exclusionary outcome is the more robust 
outcome. 
 
Proposition 2: Suppose that the downstream firms always coordinate on their 
preferred equilibrium unless the inferior equilibrium is an equilibrium in dominant 
strategies (including weakly dominant strategies). Then the simple refusal to deal 
game has a unique equilibrium where the rival does not enter and all downstream 
firms purchase from the incumbent at = .19 
Proof: 
Suppose that in period 2 the rival enters, in period 3.1 = = ̅,  and 
consider the decision of an arbitrary downstream firm in period 3.2 which we label as 
firm one. If > − ∗ then no matter what strategy firm one chooses, the rival 
                                                 
19 Expressing the proposition in this way emphasizes the power of the mechanism preventing the 
downstream firms from coordinating on their preferred equilibrium. There are also two technical 
benefits of expressing the conditions for equilibrium in this manner. First, since neither equilibrium of 
the subgame beginning in period 3.1 is preferred when = = ̅, the equilibrium refinement allows 
for the rival to succeed off the equilibrium path. Second, this equilibrium selection mechanism isolates 






will reach the minimum efficient scale and firm one will be able to purchase at ̅. If 
= − ∗ then firm one is pivotal. Since , ∗ > , , firm one 
benefits from preventing the rival from reaching the minimum efficient scale as  
− ∗ downstream rival are now excluded from the downstream market. As a result, 
firm one will choose not to place an order from the rival. Finally, if < − ∗, 
then no matter what strategy firm one chooses, the rival will not achieve the 
minimum efficient scale. Since firm one will make positive profits by choosing to 
purchase from the incumbent and zero profits by placing an order with the rival who 
will not achieve minimum scale, firm one will not choose to purchase from the rival. 
From our assumption of a sufficiently fine discrete price space there exists >  such 
that ( , ∗ ) > ,  and such that the rival still much achieve > − ∗ 
to be viable. Thus, we are guaranteed the existence of a strictly profitable  such that 
it is weakly dominant strategy to acquiesce to the incumbent’s scheme. It follows, in 
an equilibrium of the subgame beginning in period 3.1 the incumbent sets  to be the 
highest price such that when a firm is pivotal, it does not choose the rival, as the 
incumbent knows that for any higher price the downstream firms will coordinate on 
their preferred equilibrium. Thus, the rival does not enter and the incumbent sets  
= . ■ 
 
The power of the refusal to deal in this model is that it allows the incumbent 
to turn the downstream firms against each other when they attempt to coordinate on 
their preferred equilibrium. In the simple case explored here, to prevent coordination 





never worth it for a downstream firm to risk dealing with the rival. Although all of the 
downstream firms would be better off under the competitive outcome, when a 
downstream firm is pivotal, it is better off complying with scheme so that competition 
in the downstream market is reduced.  
The model thus far omits two major elements from the Naked Exclusion 
literature that potentially limit both theoretical comparison of this model to Naked 
Exclusion models and practical application of this model to real antitrust cases. First, 
we assumed that the incumbent is able to make a very strong commitment not to deal 
with downstream firms who attempted to purchase from the incumbent without 
requiring explicit contracts. The omission of explicit contracts is also problematic in 
terms of real world antitrust cases as many, including Dentsply involve such 
contracts. Second, we have assumed that a downstream firm can simply switch to the 
rival in the last period of the game without any advanced preparation or forward 
agreement. However, the records in many major antitrust cases involving dealer or 
distributor markets indicate that forward purchase agreements are necessary for a 
nascent rival trying to gain traction in a market.  
 
Section 4: A Naked Exclusion Model with Seller Committing Exclusive Contracts 
 
In this section, we consider how the simple Refusal to Deal Game can be 
adapted into a model with the Naked Exclusion structure. Specifically, we consider 
Simpson and Wickelgren’s structure as it has a number of appealing features. First, 
the Simpson and Wickelgren structure allows for downstream firms to switch from 





downstream buyers to zero we are able to emphasize the crucial contribution of seller 
commit contracts, while still indicating that the model can easily be adjusted to 
accommodate bilateral exclusive contracts (contracts involving both seller and buyer 
commitment).20 Second, the Simpson and Wickelgren model implicitly requires 
forward purchasing from the rival in period 3.2. This assumption is likely to be more 
realistic for many cases than the purchasing behavior in the previous section and 
forces us to consider how the model operates in a more rigid environment where the 
downstream firms who do not choose to purchase from the rival in period 3.2 now 
face some risk of paying a higher price for the input even if the rival achieves 
viability. Third, this structure allows us to consider the potential role of breach 
damages for seller commitment contracts and compare those to the results for buyer 
commitment contracts. 
The key step in adapting the simple Refusal to Deal Game from the previous 
section to this setting is to define exclusive contracts in terms of a seller commitment 
to do business only with a downstream firm who has not contracted to purchase from 
the rival at any stage of the game. We will now use  to denote the number of 
downstream firms who agree to the exclusive contract in period 1 and  to represent 
all those who contract with the rival in period 1.  
As a result of the refusal to deal, the downstream firms in ℛ cannot purchase 
from the incumbent in period 3. However, the  firms choosing to sign the exclusive 
contracts in period 1 are able to switch to the rival in period 3.2 for free during the 
                                                 





switching period as we set the penalty for buyer breach to zero.21 Any level of 
damages could be specified, creating exclusive contracts with bilateral commitment, 
but as we will see below, there is no need for bilateral commitment contracts in this 
model, as the seller commitment contracts are sufficient to allow the incumbent to 
enjoy the entire monopoly surplus.22 The number of downstream firms choosing to 
switch to contracting with the rival at this stage of the game is denoted . Thus, the 
total number of firms purchasing from the rival in period 3.3 is now given by + . 
As discussed above, following Simpson and Wickelgren model we require 
that the downstream firms contract with the rival in period 3.2 if they want to buy 
from the rival in period 3.3. As a result, unlike the simple Refusal to Deal Game from 
Section 3, if a downstream firm chooses to stay with the incumbent in period 3.2 and 
the incumbent is charging a higher price, the downstream firm does not get to 
purchase from the lower priced rival in period 3.3. Lemma 4 presents an important 
consequence of this modification of the game. 
 
Lemma 4:  If the rival enters and > > , then equilibrium in the subgame 
beginning in period 3.2 can take only two forms. Either + =  and all of the 
downstream firms purchase from the rival at =  or = 0, the rival exits, and 
−  firms purchase from the incumbent at . 
                                                 
21 Setting the level of breach damages to zero in the Simpson and Wickelgren setting is equivalent to 
exclusive contracts entailing no buyer commitment. 
 
22 Even if exclusive contracts are technically bilateral, enforcing buyer commitment may be very 
costly. This may help to explain why we see many more examples of cases involving seller 
commitments to withhold sales from non-compliant buyers than cases involving lawsuits against 






First, note that Lemma 2 continues to hold so we have that in equilibrium 
= . Since > , all of the firms in ℐ will either purchase entirely from the rival 
or will purchase entirely from the incumbent. Furthermore, the latter case can only 
occur if there are not sufficient firms in ℛ after period 1 to render the rival viable.    
Next, we show that + =  is an equilibrium. By assumption, the rival 
never has to sell to the entire market to gain viability, so if + = , after a single 
deviation by a downstream firm to the incumbent, the rival remains viable and the 
downstream firm is strictly worse off as it must now purchase the input at > . 
Establishing the equilibrium where = 0 and the rival exists depends on the price 
set by the incumbent and the number of firms in ℛ. For instance, if the incumbent sets 
= ∗ which we defined above as the price one increment below  and if there are 
no firms in ℛ, = 0 represents an equilibrium as a single deviation will not render 
the rival viable.23 For any price less than ∗ an equilibrium where = 0 and the 
rival exists can be specified in a similar manner as we can always fix  so that two or 
more firms have a move in period 3.2. ■ 
 
From Lemma 4 it is clear that just as in the simple Refusal to Deal Game from 
the previous section, the game as a whole has equilibria where the rival successfully 
enters and equilibria where the incumbent is successful in excluding the rival. Thus, 
                                                 






in the remainder of this section we focus on the mechanism that drives the 
exclusionary outcome and consider the robustness of this outcome.  
Because a firm that purchases from the incumbent is now unable to switch to 
the rival in the final period of the game, the weak dominance result from 
Proposition 2 will no longer hold. However, we show in Lemma 5 that a weaker 
refinement requiring that equilibria be coalition-proof has a similar effect on the 
behavior of the downstream firms. The coalition-proof Nash equilibrium refinement 
requires that equilibria be immune to self-enforcing coalitional deviations (Segal and 
Whinston, 2000).  Although this refinement is weaker, it has a very similar effect as 
to the weak dominance refinement applied in Section 3, with the role of a pivotal firm 
being replaced with pivotal coalitions of firms. 
 
Lemma 5: If ≤ − ∗ and the rival enters then the unique coalition-proof 
equilibrium of the subgame in period 3.1 is characterized by = 0, the rival exits, 
and −  firms purchase from the incumbent at > . 
Proof: 
Define  to be the smallest price increment such that > . From our 
assumption of a sufficiently fine discrete price space we have:   
(i) ( − ∗) ∗ , ∗ < ∗ 
(ii) , ∗ > , ∗ , ∗ > ( , )  
Condition (i) implies that even at a small price increment above  the rival 
must still receive purchases from − ∗ + 1 downstream firms to reach the 





of buying the input at  and facing only ∗ − 1 competitors is greater than the profit 
from purchasing the input at , but competing against the entire downstream market 
when up to ∗ − 1 purchase at . 
Suppose that in period 3.1 the upstream firms set =  and = . Note 
that all downstream firms who elect for contracts with the rival in period 1 must 
purchase from the rival or make no purchases as a result of the refusal to deal so only 
−  firms have a move in period 3.2.  
We now apply the coalitional refinement to the equilibria of the subgame 
beginning in period 3.2 noting that as a result of Lemma 4 we need only consider two 
possible equilibria.  
In the first case where + = , suppose now that a coalition of ∗ firms 
deviates to the incumbent. Since , ∗ > ( , ) the initial deviation is 
optimal. Furthermore, as the optimal sub-coalitional deviation is for one firm to leave 
the coalition and contract with the rival the condition that , ∗ >
, ∗ , ∗  ensures that no sub-coalition will deviate and the initial deviation 
is self-enforcing. Consequently, this equilibrium does not survive the coalition 
refinement.  
 For the latter equilibrium, where = 0, the rival exits, and −  
downstream firms have a move, consider a deviation by some subset of the −  
downstream firms so that the rival has sufficient purchases to achieve the minimum 
efficient scale. From condition (i) above, following a price of , the rival must 





The most profitable initial coalitional deviation is one such that 
, ∗ , ∗ > , . While this initial deviation is not always 
optimal, for the history where = 0  the initial is necessarily optimal. However, even 
when the initial deviation is optimal, a sub-coalitional deviation always exists as 
, ∗ > , ∗ , ∗ . Thus, no coalitional deviation from this 
equilibrium is self-enforcing and the equilibrium survives. Thus, following =  the 
coalitional refinement selects the equilibrium where the rival fails.  
However, as the incumbent’s price rises the benefit of excluding rivals will 
fall both because of the direct price effect and because fewer firms will be excluded. 
At some  such that ≥ > , the critical inequalities will reverse and the 
coalitional refinement will select the equilibrium where the rival succeeds in reaching 
the minimum efficient scale. As the incumbent makes no profits following a price at 
or above this level, the incumbent will simply select the maximum price such that the 
coalitional refinement selects the outcome where the rival fails which we have shown 
is guaranteed to be such that > . ■ 
 
With this Lemma we can now prove our final proposition. 
 
Proposition 3: If ( , ∗ ) > ( , ), then the unique coalition-proof 
equilibrium of the game as a whole is = , the rival does not enter, and the 







Lemma 5 demonstrates that when when ≤ − ∗ the rival will fail. So 
equilibrium in period 1 must either be characterized by > − ∗ the rival enters 
and all downstream firms purchase at  or = 0, the rival does not enter, and  
= . In the former case, consider a coalitional deviation away from > − ∗ 
so that = − ∗. Since ( , ∗ ) > ( , ) the initial coalitional 
deviation is optimal and any deviation by a sub-coalition that restores the rival to 
viability will simply result in all of the downstream firms receiving payoffs of 
( , ). Thus the initial deviation is self-enforcing. In the latter case, while the 
initial deviation is optimal as it is better for all of the downstream firms to purchase 
the input at  than at , by the same logic as in Lemma 5, a pivotal sub-coalition 
will deviate to back to the incumbent so that the downstream firms agreeing to 
purchase from the rival are exposed to the refusal to deal and excluded from the 
downstream market. Thus, the initial deviation is not self-enforcing and the 
exclusionary equilibrium survives the coalitional refinement. ■ 
 
As with the simple model from Section 3, the exclusionary strategy turns the 
downstream firms against each other when they attempt to coordinate on their 
preferred equilibrium. Any pivotal coalition of firms will have the incentive to 
undermine the equilibrium where competition prevails to gain an advantage in the 





downstream market to enter into a purchase agreement with the rival, no coalition of 
downstream firms actually gets a competitive edge and all are strictly worse off.  
An advantage of focusing on seller commitment as opposed to buyer 
commitment is that it is easy to see how commitment to the refusal to deal strategy 
could arise out of repeated interaction without institutional enforcement. However, it 
is still interesting to consider the potential for the seller to uphold the refusal to deal 
in a one-shot game where breach damages are the only force pushing the incumbent 
to honor the exclusive contract. Let  represent the price set by the incumbent in a 
coalition proof equilibrium in the subgame beginning in period 3 and suppose 
incumbent can breach its exclusive contracts by paying expectation damages. The 
case where it will be most tempting for the incumbent to breach is when only ∗ 
firms purchase from the incumbent so − ∗ are left out of the market. Under this 
scenario, the payoffs to the incumbent at the end of period 3.3 are given by: 
 ∗ ( , ∗ ) . (1) 
However, if the incumbent chooses to breach and pay expectation damages its 
payoffs are: 
 ( , ) − ∗[ ( , ∗ ) − ∗ ( , ∗ )] . (2) 
Manipulating these equations indicates that the incumbent will not breach based on a 
one-shot interaction if and only if: 





 . (3) 
While this inequality can go either way, the important point is that unlike the 
Simpson and Wickelgren model, it is plausible that expectation damages alone can 





interaction are considered as well, the seller commitment assumption employed in 
this section rests on a firm economic foundation. 
 
Section 5: Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Although the Naked Exclusion literature was the first to highlight the 
possibility that as a result of exclusive contracts downstream firms might fail to 
coordinate on their preferred equilibrium, the results of this literature fail to provide a 
strong foundation for why such behavior occurs. Rather, in the most robust 
exclusionary cases, Naked Exclusion models rely on full compensation either of a 
pivotal segment of the downstream market or, when downstream competition is 
sufficiently strong, full compensation of all buyers. The refusal to deal models 
introduced above predict exclusion as the robust outcome while maintaining the 
existence of an alternative equilibrium that is clearly preferred by all downstream 
firms. Furthermore, the model does so in a way that is consistent with legal and 
institutional context of real-world antitrust cases while still maintaining the traditional 
focus on monopolization through rival foreclosure.  
The model in Section 3 assumed immense flexibility of the rival to supply the 
market with little notice and the incumbent’s ability to commit to a refusal to deal 
without explicit contracts. Although these assumptions are admittedly quite strong, 
the result is one that turns the weak dominance result associated with the Naked 
Exclusion equilibria labeled as case (iii) in Section I on its head. In our simple model, 





equilibrium, they realize that if they are individually pivotal, it is better to let the rival 
fail and exclude other downstream firms from the market.  
Once we assume the structure of the Simpson and Wickelgren’s Naked 
Exclusion model, we require a weaker equilibrium refinement to identify a unique 
equilibrium. Yet, the underlying mechanism maintains its essential strategic purpose. 
Applying the coalitional refinement, pivotal coalitions play the same role as a pivotal 
firm in the model from Section 3. When the downstream firms attempt to coordinate 
on their preferred equilibrium, a coalition of firms will have the incentive to 
undermine this equilibrium just as a single firm does in the former case. What both 
refinements emphasize is that the strategic value of this scheme is that it turns the 
downstream firms against each other when they attempt to coordinate on their 
preferred equilibrium. 
In providing an economic theory that is consistent with cases like Dentsply 
and Lorain Journal, we believe that our approach provides an economic interpretation 
of the idea of coercion in cases involving vertical restraints. Before the rise to 
prominence of the Chicago School of Economics, courts in the United States 
frequently expressed strong hostility towards vertical restraints like exclusive dealing. 
Courts evinced particular concern about situations where buyers were “coerced” or 
“forced” into vertical restraints.24 In the first written statement of the Chicago 
argument, Director and Levi (1956) took direct aim at the coercion doctrine, arguing 
that firms attempting coercion through vertical restraints would “lose revenue because 
they cannot both obtain the advantage of the original [monopoly] power and impose 
                                                 





additional coercive restrictions so as to increase their monopoly power.” Over time, 
the scholars associated with the Chicago School expanded the argument to the 
formulation made famous by Bork (1978). Bork’s argument consisted of two prongs: 
first, if exclusive dealing cannot be imposed through coercion, then “exclusivity is not 
an imposition, it is a purchase.” Second, “a supplier cannot purchase its way to 
monopoly though exclusive dealing contracts.” These arguments became highly 
influential in law, dramatically affecting courts’ assessments of cases involving 
allegations of anticompetitive exclusive dealing. In addition, the Chicago School 
arguments effectively banished the notion of coercion from the economic discourse 
on exclusive dealing.  
While the Naked Exclusion equilibria labeled (i) and (ii) in Section 2 belie the 
second prong of Bork’s argument, to date the Naked Exclusion literature does not 
provide any clear mechanism through which buyers can be said to have been forced 
or coerced into failing to coordinate on their preferred equilibrium. On the other hand, 
here the failure to coordinate on a preferred equilibrium is clearly driven by the 
incumbent’s ability to turn the downstream firms against each while providing no 
compensation for exclusivity. In other words, exclusivity is an imposition, not a 
purchase. 
Our model also provides some interesting intuition on the role of contracts in 
cases involving instances of coercive exclusive dealing. The model in Section 3 
assumed that the incumbent could commit to the refusal to deal without explicit 
contracts. However, as a result of the explicit contracts in Section 4, a much more 





The ( , ∗ ) > ( , ) from Proposition 3 arises because with explicit 
contracts the downstream firms gain an early mover advantage and now consider the 
tradeoff between the full exclusionary outcome and competition. The model thus 
suggests an interesting tradeoff: while explicit contracts may provide greater ability to 
commit, there is a cost in terms of the ability to implement the refusal to deal strategy.  
In addition to these points of economic interest, we conclude by considering 
the potential of our models to clarify certain specific issues antitrust jurisprudence. 
For instance, some courts have argued that only long-term exclusive contracts have 
anticompetitive potential, and short-term contracts are generally permissible. In Barry 
Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp. (1983), the First Circuit Court of Appeals cited 
the fact that the contracts at issue covered a “fairly short time period” in concluding 
that a series of exclusive arrangements did not represent anticompetitive exclusive 
dealing. In the Seventh Circuit the following year, Richard Posner one of the legal 
scholars most associated with the Chicago School of Economics, wrote in Roland 
Machinery Co. v. Dresser Industries that, “[e]xclusive-dealing contracts terminable in 
less than a year are presumptively lawful.” Cases (iii) and (iv) from the Naked 
Exclusion literature discussed above could be seen as providing an economic basis for 
this presumption. Under this logic, short-term contracts with many opportunities for 
renegotiation would help to promote buyer coordination on a preferred equilibrium, 
undermining the potential for anticompetitive exclusion. However, in the refusal to 
deal model developed in this article, even when exclusive contracts are specified so 





still succeeds. Thus, the presumption that short-term contracts are inherently 
procompetitive may not be warranted. 
Another interesting application of this model is in the evaluation of class 
action cases involving direct purchasers. Antitrust class action cases seeking damages 
are often certified under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(b)3 which requires 
that courts find that “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate 
over any questions affecting only individual members.” Legal commentators have 
asserted that the inherent conflicts among direct purchaser class members in exclusive 
dealing cases may render direct purchaser class actions non-viable, and the Naked 
Exclusion literature may currently be seen as supporting this view of exclusive 
dealing cases.25 In the robust equilibria from the Naked Exclusion literature some 
subset of downstream firms act as participants rather than victims of the exclusionary 
scheme. On the other hand, our results suggest that is is possible for all direct 
purchaser class members to be harmed by an anticompetitive exclusive dealing 
scheme. 
 
                                                 












Section 1: Introduction 
 
Mutual funds are governed under the Investment Company Act of 1940. 
In 1970, Congress added Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act, which 
authorized both the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and private 
plaintiffs to sue mutual fund managers for charging “excessive fees.” While the law 
and its economic consequences have been subject to extensive legal and policy 
debate, including the high profile case Jones v. Harris Associates which pitted Judge 
Frank Easterbrook and Judge Richard Posner against each other in the 7th Circuit 
before going the U.S. Supreme Court, the law has been subject to scant rigorous 
empirical analysis. In this paper, we use program evaluation techniques and the 
Center for Research in Security Price’s (CRSP) extensive data on mutual funds to 
analyze the consequences of the onset of 36(b) enforcement on mutual fund fees, fund 
flows, fund returns, and exit rates before and after SEC v. Fundpack (1979), which 
was the first legal action to invoke the law. We find that high-fee mutual funds 
reduced their fees substantially in response to the onset of excessive fee litigation but 
we find no evidence of reduced mutual fund quality or consumer choice as indicated 
by fund flows, returns, or exit rates.  
These findings are particularly salient when developed in the context of the 





center of the debate over the proper scope and administration of financial regulation. 
In the 2008 case Jones v Harris Associates, Judge Frank Easterbrook wrote an 
opinion that attacked the economic logic of the law articulating a standard for 
excessive fee cases that would have, for all intents and purposes, vitiated its 
regulatory impact. Easterbrook argued that since the mutual fund industry is 
competitive, the notion of an excessive fee is meaningless in the absence of outright 
fraud.  Furthermore, he averred that despite the fact that mutual funds rarely fire their 
investment advisors, “investors can and do ‘fire’ advisers cheaply and easily by 
moving their money elsewhere.” Easterbrook dismissed the argument that most 
mutual fund investors are unsophisticated and fail to understand the pricing structure 
of the industry and countered that a limited number of sophisticated investors create 
sufficient competitive pressure to protect all investors. The implication of 
Easterbrook’s argument is simple: rather than limiting rents, regulation through 
excessive fee enforcement only serves to render the mutual fund industry less 
competitive and less efficient by reducing mutual fund quality or consumer choice.  
Although Judge Richard Posner has long been one the figures most associated 
with the “Chicago School of Economics”, Posner issued a dissenting opinion 
expressing skepticism towards the validity of Easterbrook’s economic analysis. 
Indeed, Posner wrote that Easterbrook’s opinion was predicated on “an economic 
analysis that is ripe for reexamination on the basis of growing indications that 
executive compensation in large publicly traded firms is excessive because of the 
feeble incentives of boards of directors to police compensation.” Posner’s economic 





behavioral economic literature suggesting that investors are subject to irrational 
behavior that can undermine the efficient functioning of markets (Thaler, 1985; 
Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Odean, 1998; Barberis et al., 
2001; Barberis and Thaler, 2003) and the empirical literature suggesting that actively 
managed mutual funds do not outperform passive, index-based strategies, (Jensen, 
1968; Malkiel, 1995; Carhart, 1997; Fama and French, 2010). Posner’s argument thus 
implies that mutual fund managers may earn inefficient rents by taking advantage of 
market imperfections or frictions. 
In line with Easterbrook’s position, a very prominent analysis of the mutual 
fund industry, Wallison and Litan (2007) asserts that far from reducing mutual fund 
fees, excessive fee litigation is both the reason that many funds continue to charge 
high fees and that the mutual fund industry is still subject to high price dispersion 
despite the existence of low-cost index funds. The premise of their argument is that 
section 36(b) creates a de facto “rate regulation” structure in the mutual fund industry. 
Wallison and Litan summarize the meaning of this analogy to rate regulation as 
follows, “[s]imply put, price competition and price convergence have not occurred in 
the mutual fund industry because there is little incentive for investment advisors to 
reduce costs.” 
Thus, our contribution is to bring rigorous program evaluation techniques to 
bear on the questions raised by these conflicting views of the mutual fund industry 
and the nature of the fees charged to investors. We begin by considering the 
consequences of the onset of excessive fee litigation for the fees charged by high-fee 





high-fee mutual before and after 1978, suggesting that the SEC’s enforcement action 
against Fundpack and subsequent suits had a strong effect on prices, which in the 
absence of quality reduction or restriction of consumer choice would increase 
consumer welfare. 
However, to the extent that the mutual fund industry is operating efficiently 
Easterbrook’s and Wallison and Litan’s economic logic would suggest just such a 
countervailing effect. We employ two measures of mutual fund quality: the responses 
of mutual fund investors as measured by fund flows and the returns offered by mutual 
funds. We find no evidence of fund outflows or reductions in returns for high-fee 
funds that would be indicative of a reduction in quality. We also find no evidence of 
an increase in the probability of exit by high-fee funds, suggesting that consumer 
choice was not impaired as a result of enforcement. 
 
Section 2: Methodology 
 
 
 The primary methodology we employ to assess the consequences of the onset 
of 36(b) litigation on mutual fund fees and operations is difference-in-difference 
analysis. For the first step in our analysis, our main parameter of interest is the change 
in fees charged by mutual funds at risk of being prosecuted for charging excessive 
fees following SEC v. Fundpack, which was publicly announced in the SEC News 
Digest on March 23, 1979. While it is impossible to identify which funds were at risk 
for prosecution after this announcement, since the onset of 36(b) litigation, the fees 
charged by funds relative to their peers have always been one of the primary 





defining the at-risk group is essentially a “revealed preference” approach where we 
use the actions of the SEC to the assist in the definition of the treatment group. Thus, 
we define our treatment group based on whether a mutual fund had fees higher than 
Fundpack in 1978 at any point prior to SEC v. Fundpack. We classify all other mutual 
funds within the control group.  
We evaluate the changes in fees charged by for high-fee funds relative to low-
fee funds by evaluating the difference in fees charged before and after 1979. 
Formally, we estimate the following: 
 = + +  +  ∗ +  (1) 
where   is the expense ratio for mutual fund  and year ,  are mutual fund fixed 
effects,  are year dummies, and   represents the total net assets of mutual 
fund  at time . We cluster standard errors by fund manager since there is likely to be 
serial correlation within management across years. 
 For our difference-in-difference analysis, we require a balanced panel. In 
balancing our panel we are forced to confront a trade-off between inclusion of as 
many funds as possible and the number of years our panel spans before and after 
SEC v. Fundpack. In setting our event window we also face a tradeoff between 
continued surveillance of the effects of excessive fee enforcement and inclusion of 
sufficient data before the event of interest. Our primary approach is to present results 
for a panel of funds spanning from 1975 to 1984. In selecting this 10-year span as our 
primary window we are motivated by a number of factors. First, 36(b) litigation 
continued after 1979 with notable cases such as SEC v. American Birthright 





continued path of high-fee mutual fund fees over the years following the onset of 
36(b) litigation. Second, although a longer event window excludes funds that do not 
last the entire time period, the funds that continue to exist over a longer time span are 
the most economically significant and visible mutual funds. However, it is still 
relevant to consider how the results differ when different cohorts and event windows 
are chosen. Thus, in the appendices to this paper we provide results for a 10-year 
window from 1974 to 1983 and a 12-year window from 1973–1974. These results are 
qualitatively quite similar to our primary results indicating that our conclusions are 
robust to concerns about panel selection and time period.   
 Our identifying assumption is that there are no other time varying 
unobservable factors that systematically affect high-fee funds relative to low-fee 
funds. In terms of potentially overestimating the effect of excessive fee enforcement, 
our primary concern is that the lower fees are for a given fund, the less appropriate 
they are as a control for the group of high-fee funds. We use three approaches to 
mitigate this concern. First, in addition to our primary difference-in-difference 
estimates we include event study estimates, which allow us to test the pattern of the 
treatment and control groups before SEC v. Fundpack. Second, as a robustness test 
we consider variations on the control group where we remove funds below the 10th, 
25th, and 50th percentiles of the low-fee control group from the analysis. Third, we 
conduct placebo testing of our primary difference-in-difference specification using 
data for years before the onset of excessive fee litigation in 1979.  
 To the extent that excessive fee litigation drives high-fee mutual fund fees 





If competition was operating effectively in the mutual fund industry and the high fees 
charged by high-fee funds reflected high operation costs rather economic rents, then 
reducing the fees charged by these funds could lead to the reduction of mutual fund 
quality or restricted consumer choice through widespread exit from the market. As we 
find evidence that high-fee mutual funds reduced their fees as a result of the onset of 
excessive fee litigation, we examine the quality of services offered by funds along 
two dimensions. First, to the extent that the quality of high-fee mutual funds was 
reduced as a result of the regulation, consumers perceiving this loss of quality would 
reduce their ownership in the affected funds. A useful metric for assessing the net 
investor activity for a given mutual fund is the fund flow. We define the fund flow 
following Sirri and Tufano (1998) as: 
 
Flow =  
 – (1 + ) ∗
 (2) 
where  represent total net assets held by the fund and  represents the rate of 
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 (3) 
where  is the net asset value or value per share of the mutual fund and  
accounts for any dividends dispersed to investors. Second as returns are the primary 
metric that investors evaluate in determining the quality of a mutual fund we also 
consider a version of our difference-in-difference specification that compares the 





 While flows and returns provide reliable quality measures for existing funds it 
is also possible that the onset of the regulation caused high-fee mutual funds to 
inefficiently exit the industry leaving consumers with fewer options. Thus, we also 
examine how the exit rate of funds evolved over time outside of the balanced panel 
that underlies our difference-in-difference results. Specifically, we assess whether 
high-fee mutual funds are more or likely to exit the market after the onset of 
excessive feel litigation by analyzing the exit rate probability for the set of mutual 
funds who were in operation from 1975–1979. 
 
Section 3: Data 
 
 
 We use the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database for this 
analysis. The CRSP database contains detailed data for the universe of mutual funds 
from 1962 to the present. Critically for this study, CRSP maintains data on mutual 
fund fees as measured by the expense ratio which is the percentage of shareholders’ 
total investment that is paid on an annual basis for participation in the fund. CRSP 
also maintains monthly data on a number of mutual fund characteristics, including 
total net assets ( ), which measures fund size, and net asset value ( ) which is 
the value per share of a fund. Because mutual fund fees are measured at the end of 
each year and monthly  and  are the values as of the last trading day of each 
month, we use the measured values for last day in December of each year as our 
primary unit of observation. Consequently, as SEC v. Fundpack was initiated and 





after follow the event of interest and all results for 1978 and before precede the event 
of interest.    
As discussed above, in order to construct a balanced panel for difference-in-
difference analysis we restrict our sample to mutual funds that operated continuously 
from 1975 to 1984. This restriction leads to the loss of some funds from the data. We 




 High Fee Funds Low-Fee Funds 
# of Mutual Funds 53 250 
# of Mutual Funds Kept 29 219 
Economic Value $302 million $17,518 million 
% Economic Value 86.1% 89.9% 
Cohort 
Average Fee (1975) 270 basis points 106 basis points 
Average  (1975) $9.29 million $92.64 million 
Average  (1975) $10.49 $10.01 
 
The first row of Table 3.1 indicates the entire universe of funds existing 
in 1975 and classifies them as either high fee or low fee based on our assignment 
strategy. As described above, in order to construct a balanced panel for difference-in-
difference analysis we restrict our sample to mutual funds that operated continuously 
from 1975 to 1984. The top panel shows that although we lose some funds as a result 
of our restriction to a 10-year cohort, by far the majority of the economic value of the 
funds as measured by  is preserved. The bottom panel then provides the average 






Section 4: Results 
 
 
We begin our investigation of the effects of excessive fee enforcement by 
plotting a simple time series of the mean fees for the high-fee and low-fee groups.  In 
Figure 3.1, we plot the mean fee by year measured as of December in each year. As 
the SEC’s enforcement action against Fundpack was initiated and completed in the 
Spring of 1979, to the extent that the suit is responsible for reducing mutual fund fees, 




The cohort used here are all domestic mutual funds within the CRSP data that appear every year 
from 1975 to 1984, inclusive. High fee funds are defined as mutual funds who had a fee higher than 
193 basis points during any year from 1975 to 1978, inclusive, and low fee funds are defined as all 
other funds. The dependent variable used is the level of the fee, as defined by December fee fund of 
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Figure 3.1 indicates that the low-fee group of funds experiences very stable 
fees over the time period with no appreciable difference before and after 1978.  On 
the other hand, the high-fee group of funds experiences a significant decline in fees 
starting after 1978.  
In Figure 3.2, we consider the possibility of heterogeneity within groups by 





In interpreting Figure 3.2, it is useful to keep in mind that Fundpack’s 1978 
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there is little heterogeneity in the control group and provides strong suggestive 
evidence as to the appropriateness of our identification strategy. 
Having considered these patterns in our underlying data, we now consider our 




High Fee Fund * (Year ≥ 1979) –58.325 
Standard Error 23.982 
P-Value 0.016 
Unconditional Average 120.247 
Results are in basis points. The cohort used here are all domestic mutual funds within the CRSP data 
that appear every year from 1975 to 1984, inclusive. High fee funds are defined as mutual funds who 
had a fee higher than 193 basis points during any year from 1975 to 1978, inclusive, and low fee funds 
are defined as all other funds. The dependent variable used is the level of the fee, as defined by 
December fee fund of the calendar year. Standard errors are clustered by manager of the mutual fund. 
 
Table 3.2 indicates that the basic patterns suggested by Figures 3.1 and 3.2 
continue to hold after controlling for time, mutual fund, and fund size. The 
difference-in-difference results indicate that the decline in mutual fund fees for the 
high-fee group was approximately 60 basis points or almost one-third of the total fees 
charged by Fundpack in 1978 and almost half of the unconditional average fee. 
To see how this effect evolved across time in more precise detail, in Table 3.3 
we expand empirical equation (1) into an “event study” format, where we look at the 
yearly evolution while controlling for time-invariant mutual fund and aggregate year 
effects.1 
                                                 
1 The empirical specification for this would be: 
= + + + (Year = ) ∗ +  
where , , , ,  are the same as they were in empirical equation (1). The coefficients of 
interest are , = 1976 … 1985. , for example, represents the difference in  from 1975 to 1980 






 Point Estimate Standard Error P-Value 
High Fee Fund*(Year ≥ 1976) –3.129 30.213 0.918 
High Fee Fund*(Year ≥ 1977) –35.854 21.235 0.093 
High Fee Fund*(Year ≥ 1978) –15.392 29.262 0.600 
High Fee Fund*(Year ≥ 1979) –56.264 30.084 0.063 
High Fee Fund*(Year ≥ 1980) –63.534 30.110 0.036 
High Fee Fund*(Year ≥ 1981) –68.334 32.477 0.037 
High Fee Fund*(Year ≥ 1982) –71.742 34.296 0.038 
High Fee Fund*(Year ≥ 1983) –77.916 33.495 0.021 
High Fee Fund*(Year ≥ 1984) –93.347 32.027 0.004 
P-Value from F test for equality: 
1976=1977=1978=0 
0.1788 
The cohort used here are all domestic mutual funds within the CRSP data that appear every year from 
1975 to 1984, inclusive. High fee funds are defined as mutual funds who had a fee higher than 193 
basis points during any year from 1975 to 1978, inclusive, and low fee funds are defined as all other 
funds. The dependent variable used is the level of the fee, as defined by December fee fund of the 
calendar year. 
 
Table 3.3 indicates that prior to 1979, the coefficients are not jointly 
significantly different from zero, suggesting that the cohort of high-fee funds are 
comparable with the low-fee funds. This provides further evidence as to the 
suitability of the low-fee fund group as a control group. Table 3.3 also indicates that 
after 1978 fees decline monotonically suggesting the continued and cumulative effect 
of mutual fund excessive fee enforcement in reducing the fees charged by high-fee 
mutual funds. 
The above analysis provides compelling evidence that excessive fee 
enforcement was successful in reducing the prices charged by high-fee mutual funds. 
However, even if enforcement was successful in lowering fees, it is still possible, as 
suggested by Easterbrook’s economic analysis, that lower fees could still be 
associated with worse consumer outcomes if lower fees reduce the quality of mutual 
fund management services or reduce consumers’ set of mutual fund options. In the 





measures of quality, fund flows and fund returns, and then conclude with an 
examination as to whether there is any evidence that SEC’s enforcement action 
induced an increased likelihood of exit for high-fee funds.  
In Table 3.4, we apply our difference-in-difference model where the 
dependent variable is now the fund flow as set forth in equation (2). The logic behind 
employing fund flow as a measure of quality is that it provides a “revealed-
preference” measure of mutual fund quality. To the extent that the decreases in fees 
associated with high-fee funds cause mutual fund quality to fall, this should be 




Point Estimate 0.276 
Standard Error 0.31 
P-Value 0.376 
Unconditional Average 1.145 
The cohort and high fee fund definitions are the same as those used within table 3.2. The dependent 
variable is flow, which is defined by empirical equations (2) and (3). Standard errors are clustered by 
manager of the mutual fund. 
 
Table 3.4 indicates that there is no concomitant effect on fund flows for  
high-fee funds relative to low-fee funds associated with the decrease in fund fees 
induced by the SEC’s enforcement action against Fundpack. 
We also assess mutually fund quality directly by looking at the returns offered 
by high-fee mutual funds relative to low-fee funds following SEC v. Fundpack. As 
the main service offered by mutual funds is to provide superior returns to investors, to 
the extent that a fund’s quality is degraded, this would likely be reflected in lower 







High Fee Fund * (Year ≥ 1979) 0.042 
Standard Error 0.036 
P-Value 0.255 
Unconditional Average 0.096 
The cohort and high fee fund definitions are the same as those used within table 3.2. The dependent 
variable is flow, which is defined by empirical equations (2) and (3). Standard errors are clustered by 
manager of the mutual fund. 
 
Like Table 3.4, Table 3.5 indicates that there is no statistically significant 
effect associated with this measure of mutual fund quality. Thus, although we find 
evidence of significant decreases in mutual fund fees as a result of the first 
enforcement action prosecuted under 36(b), we find little indication of countervailing 
reductions in quality. 
Our final analysis in this section looks beyond the cohort of mutual funds 
examined above, which necessarily existed throughout the entire time period to 
consider the hypothesis that high-fee mutual funds were more likely to exit the 
industry as a result of the threat of excessive fee prosecution. We first subset our data 
to include only those mutual funds that existed during 1975 to 1979, inclusive. Then 
we analyze whether high-fee funds were more or less likely to exit the industry after 
the lawsuit by evaluating the additional probability of a fund being in operation based 
on being a high-fee fund relative to a low-fee fund. More formally, for each year from 
1980-1984, in separate regressions, we estimate the following equations: 
 = +  +  +  (4) 
The outcome,  is a binary variable that equals 1 if mutual fund  had a record within 
a given year.  is once again the total net assets of the mutual fund , and for these 





dummy for whether or not the mutual fund is a high-fee fund. Our coefficient of 
interest is , which is the difference in the probability of a high-fee fund staying 
within the market relative to a low-fee fund. We estimate the above equation 




 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Point Estimate 0.029 0.014 –0.002 –0.032 –0.051 
Std Error 0.028 0.047 0.051 0.052 0.056 
P-Value 0.306 0.768 0.963 0.536 0.366 
The cohort used here are all domestic mutual funds within the CRSP data that appear every year from 
1975 to 1979, inclusive. High fee funds are defined the same way as table 3.2. The dependent variable 
is a binary variable equaling 1 if the mutual fund existed within CRSP during that year, 0 otherwise. 
 
As indicated above, there is no significant effect on the probability that a high-
fee fund exits the market for any of the years listed above. 
 
Section 5: Robustness 
 
 
One of the biggest concerns is some of the low-fee funds may not be 
appropriate for inclusion in the control group, since mutual funds with very low fees 
may not be sufficiently comparable to the treatment group of high-fee funds. Our 
informal analysis in Figure 3.2 provides some evidence to suggest the overall 
comparability of the funds throughout the control group, but we now consider the 
issue more formally. Specifically, in Table 3.7 we consider the difference-in-
difference estimates from equation (1) when we take out the bottom 10th percentile, 






Removing the Bottom 10th Percentile 
High Fee Fund * (Year ≥ 1979) –56.492 
Standard Error 23.977 
P-Value 0.020 
Unconditional Average 127.983 
Removing the Bottom 25th Percentile 
High Fee Fund * (Year ≥ 1979) –55.265 
Standard Error 24.026 
P-Value 0.023 
Unconditional Average 140.329 
Removing the Bottom 50th Percentile 
High Fee Fund * (Year ≥ 1979) –52.711 
Standard Error 25.028 
P-Value 0.039 
Unconditional Average 166.192 
 
Table 3.7 indicates that the results are very similar regardless of which 
specification of the control group is employed. Crucially, these results indicate that 
the primary results are not simply an artifact of comparing funds with high natural 
volatility relative to those with low natural volatility. Another test we implement to 
mitigate the effects of level differences is to run the same specification as (1) again, 
but this time using the natural log of fees as the dependent variable. These results are 
presented in Table 3.8 and indicate that our conclusions are robust to concerns about 
differences in levels. 
 
Table 3.8 
High Fee Fund * (Year ≥ 1979) –0.2375 
Standard Error 0.0643 
P-Value 0 






Finally, to conclude, in Table 3.9 we consider a series of placebo tests for ten-
year cohorts beginning in 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, and 1969 where the time period is 




High Fee Fund * (Year ≥ 1970) –9.152 
Standard Error 10.836 
P-Value 0.402 
Unconditional Average 86.461 
1966–1975 
High Fee Fund * (Year ≥ 1971) –23.384 
Standard Error 14.994 
P-Value 0.124 
Unconditional Average 90.347 
1967–1976 
High Fee Fund * (Year ≥ 1972) –14.313 
Standard Error 16.588 
P-Value 0.391 
Unconditional Average 99.056 
1968–1977 
High Fee Fund * (Year ≥ 1973) 18.954 
Standard Error 19.958 
P-Value 0.344 
Unconditional Average 110.547 
1969–1978 
High Fee Fund * (Year ≥ 1973) 15.072 
Standard Error 18.569 
P-Value 0.418 
Unconditional Average 113.232 
For the “1965–1974” years, the cohort used here are all domestic mutual funds within the CRSP data 
that appear every year from 1965 to 1974, inclusive. The treatment year is 1970. For the “1966–1975” 
years, the cohort used here are all domestic mutual funds within the CRSP data that appear every year 
from 1966 to 1975, inclusive. The treatment year is 1971. For the “1967–1976” years, the cohort used 
here are all domestic mutual funds within the CRSP data that appear every year from 1967 to 1976, 
inclusive. The treatment year is 1972. For the “1968–1977” years, the cohort used here are all domestic 
mutual funds within the CRSP data that appear every year from 1968 to 1977, inclusive. The treatment 
year is 1973. For the “1969–1978” years, the cohort used here are all domestic mutual funds within the 
CRSP data that appear every year from 1969 to 1978, inclusive. The treatment year is 1974. The 
dependent variable used is the level of the fee, as defined by December fee fund of the calendar year. 
Standard errors are clustered by manager of the mutual fund. Mutual funds are defined as “High-Fee” 






As none of these trials indicates a false positive, these results suggest that our 
primary estimates are credible. 
 
Section 6: Conclusion 
 
 
While excessive fee litigation has been the focus of vigorous debates among 
prominent figures in law and economics, the onset of excessive fee litigation has not 
previously been analyzed in the context of rigorous empirical methods. Our results 
suggest that the SEC’s enforcement action against Fundpack in the Spring of 1979 
ushered in a period of regulatory pressure that forced the highest-fee mutual funds to 
lower their fees quite substantially. However, this decrease in fees was not associated 
with any evidence of reduced quality as measured by either fund flows or the returns 
offered by high-fee mutual funds. Thus, in terms of the economic debates surrounding 
excessive fee enforcement, our analysis is quite consistent with Posner’s suggestion 
that there is reason to believe that the mutual fund industry does not operate 
efficiently. Furthermore, our results are also inconsistent with the theory expounded 
by Wallison and Litan that excessive fee litigation is responsible for continued 








Section A1: Appendix for Chapter 1 
 
A1.1: Propensity Score Adjusted Results 
 
 
The identification of imputed observations in the CM by White et al. (2015) 
indicates that a significant number of the Foster et al. (2008) ready-mix concrete plant 
observations included imputed product level revenue or quantity data. In my primary 
analysis presented above, as in the previous literature, I dropped all imputed 
observations, including the newly identified imputations. However, recent papers 
using Census data have employed propensity score methods to assess the validity of 
the missing-at-random assumption implicit in the standard approach (Pierce, 2011; 
Davis et al., 2014). In this section, I subject my main results to inverse probability 
weighting using propensity scores to examine whether the patterns observed above 
are robust to selection issues in the data. 
I construct propensity scores by fitting logit specifications for each time 
period where the dependent variable is an indicator of whether the observation is in 
the sample of continuing ready- mix concrete plants with product revenue and 
quantity data. I employ five specifications of the propensity score model. Each 
specification includes controls for plant size, plant age, and multi-unit status as 
employed in Davis et al. (2014) as well as the variables ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL 
and ACQUIRING to control for potential selection on the variables of primary interest 





observations may be associated with smaller plants. Furthermore, because inclusion 
in this study requires quantity data in two consecutive CM years, missing data in 
either year  or  can cause an observation to be missing in my study. To account for 
both of these potential sources of missing data, I employ 5 different specifications of 
the propensity score model where each specification is distinguished by the functional 
form and point in time used for the plant size control, which is measured in terms of 
employment. 
In specification 1, I include employment in year  in addition to the other 
variables. In specification 2, I include employment and the square of employment in 
year . In specification 3, I include employment in year . In specification 4, I 
include employment and the square of employment in year . In specification 5, I 
include employment in both year  and . 
Table A1.1 applies each propensity score specification to the benchmark price 
results from while Table A1.2 and Table A1.3 present the propensity score adjusted 
results for the benchmark quantity and TFPQ results. Table A1.4 presents the 
propensity score adjusted results for the local versus non-local horizontal merger 
analysis and Table A1.5 applies propensity scores to the results controlling for lagged 
price. The propensity score adjusted results indicate that both the pattern and 









Table A1.1: Propensity Score Adjusted Benchmark Price Results 
 [A1.1] [A1.2] [A1.3] [A1.4] [A1.5] 
Dep. Var. PRICE PRICE PRICE PRICE PRICE 
ACQUIRED 
HORIZONTAL ACB 
0.074*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.072*** 0.073*** 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
ACQUIRING ACB 
0.060 0.061 0.063 0.056 0.061 
(0.059) (0.058) (0.060) (0.057) (0.059) 
R-Squared 0.444 0.447 0.439 0.452 0.441 
N 1,980 1,980 1,980 1,980 1,980 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
Regressions control for lagged TFPQ, lagged revenue, lagged capital equipment, lagged structural 
capital, lagged labor input, lagged materials input, lagged energy input, multi-unit status, age, change 
in construction employment, population density, EA-year interactions and include quantity weights. 
Standard errors are clustered by CEA. 
 
Table A1.2: Propensity Score Adjusted Benchmark Quantity Results 
 [A2.1] [A2.2] [A2.3] [A2.4] [A2.5] 
Dep. Var. QUANTITY QUANTITY QUANTITY QUANTITY QUANTITY 
ACQUIRED 
HORIZONTAL ACB 
−0.146* −0.147* −0.147* −0.148* −0.148* 
(0.078) (0.082) (0.078) (0.078) (0.079) 
ACQUIRING ACB 
−0.085 −0.085 −0.082 −0.062 −0.086 
(0.135) (0.138) (0.129) (0.128) (0.135) 
R-Squared 0.621 0.641 0.619 0.671 0.624 
N 1,980 1,980 1,980 1,980 1,980 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
Regressions control for lagged TFPQ, lagged revenue, lagged capital equipment, lagged structural 
capital, lagged labor input, lagged materials input, lagged energy input, multi-unit status, age, change 
in construction employment, population density, EA-year interactions and include quantity weights. 
Standard errors are clustered by CEA. 
 
Table A1.3: Propensity Score Adjusted Benchmark TFPQ Results 
 [A3.1] [A3.2] [A3.3] [A3.4] [A3.5] 
Dep. Var. TFPQ TFPQ TFPQ TFPQ TFPQ 
ACQUIRED 
HORIZONTAL ACB 
0.044* 0.043* 0.046* 0.046* 0.044* 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
ACQUIRING ACB 
0.011 0.014 0.016 0.018 0.011 
(0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) 
R-Squared 0.598 0.610 0.599 0.619 0.598 
N 1,980 1,980 1,980 1,980 1,980 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
Regressions control for lagged TFPQ, lagged revenue, lagged capital equipment, lagged structural 
capital, lagged labor input, lagged materials input, lagged energy input, multi-unit status, age, change 
in construction employment, population density, EA-year interactions and include quantity weights. 






Table A1.4: Propensity Score Adjusted Local Versus Non-Local Horizontal Merger 
Results 
 [A4.1] [A4.2] [A4.3] [A4.4] [A4.5] 
Dep. Var. PRICE PRICE PRICE PRICE PRICE 
ACQUIRED 
HORIZONTAL ACB 
0.087** 0.086** 0.087*** 0.086*** 0.086*** 
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
ACQUIRED 
HORIZONTAL OUT 
0.004 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.003 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
ACQUIRING ACB 
0.061 0.063 0.064 0.059 0.061 
(0.063) (0.061) (0.063) (0.061) (0.063) 
ACQUIRING OUT 
0.020 0.022 0.021 0.023 0.020 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
TFPQ −0.269*** −0.266*** −0.268*** −0.262*** −0.271*** (0.040) (0.038) (0.042) (0.041) (0.040) 
R-Squared 0.468 0.469 0.463 0.475 0.466 
N 1,980 1,980 1,980 1,980 1,980 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
Regressions control for the change in TFPQ (∆TFPQ), lagged price, lagged capital equipment, lagged 
structural capital, lagged labor input, lagged materials input, lagged energy input, multi-unit status, 
age, change in construction employment, population density, EA-year interactions and include quantity 
weights. Standard errors are clustered by CEA. 
 
Table A1.5: Propensity Scored Adjusted Results Controlling for Initial Price 
 [A5.1] [A5.2] [A5.3] [A5.4] [A5.5] 
Dep. Var. PRICE PRICE PRICE PRICE PRICE 
ACQUIRED 
HORIZONTAL ACB 
0.070** 0.069** 0.072*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 
(0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
ACQUIRED 
HORIZONTAL OUT 
0.006 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.005 
(0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) 
ACQUIRING ACB 
0.074* 0.075* 0.079* 0.074* 0.075* 
(0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
ACQUIRING OUT 
0.006 0.008 0.005 0.006 0.005 
(0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
TFPQ −0.170*** −0.168*** −0.171*** −0.165*** −0.172*** (0.031) (0.030) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) 
R-Squared 0.565 0.568 0.561 0.569 0.563 
N 1,980 1,980 1,980 1,980 1,980 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
Regressions control for the change in TFPQ (∆TFPQ), lagged price, lagged capital equipment, lagged 
structural capital, lagged labor input, lagged materials input, lagged energy input, multi-unit status, 
age, change in construction employment, population density, EA-year interactions and include quantity 






A1.2: Unweighted Results 
 
 
In this appendix, I provide unweighted results to demonstrate the robustness 
of my conclusions to weighting used in the primary results. Table A1.6 considers the 
unweighted benchmark results for price, quantity, and TFPQ. 
 
Table A1.6: Unweighted Benchmark Results 
 [A6.1] [A6.2] [A6.3] 
Dep. Var. PRICE QUANTITY TFPQ 
ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL ACB 
0.041*** −0.097 0.074*** 
(0.019) (0.067) (0.024) 
ACQUIRING ACB 
0.040 −0.120 0.079 
(0.034) (0.131) (0.050) 
R-Squared 0.415 0.529 0.568 
N 1,980 1,980 1,980 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
Regressions control for EA-year interactions. Standard errors are clustered by CEA. 
 
Overall, the direction and pattern of the results is quite similar before and after 
quantity weighting. However, the estimated change in price for ACQUIRED 
HORIZONTAL ACB plants in Regression [A6.1] is smaller than the weighted 
counterpart and the estimated change in quantity for ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL 
ACB plants falls below the level of statistical significance. 
In Table A1.7, I consider the unweighted results for local versus non-local 
horizontal mergers. In regression [A7.1], I consider the effects on prices using the 
benchmark specification controlling for lagged revenue, and in regression [A7.2] I 
use the specification controlling for lagged price instead of revenue. Regression 






Table A1.7: Unweighted Local Versus Non-Local Horizontal Merger Results 
 [A7.1] [A7.2] [A7.3] 
Dep. Var. PRICE PRICE QUANTITY 
ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL ACB 
0.058*** 0.040* −0.142*** 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.067) 
ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL OUT 
−0.011 0.002 0.042 
(0.028) (0.026) (0.178) 
ACQUIRING ACB 
0.053 0.061* −0.175 
(0.038) (0.032) (0.122) 
ACQUIRING OUT 
0.014 0.001 0.032 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.053) 
TFPQ −0.233*** −0.141*** 0.660*** (0.025) (0.121) (0.075) 
R-Squared 0.437 0.551 0.564 
N 1,980 1,980 1,980 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
Regressions control for the change in TFPQ (∆TFPQ), lagged price, lagged capital equipment, lagged 
structural capital, lagged labor input, lagged materials input, lagged energy input, multi-unit status, 
age, change in construction employment, population density, and EA-year interactions. Standard errors 
are clustered by CEA. 
 
Again, the results are quite similar, except that the estimated effects for 
ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL ACB plants are smaller. Notably, despite the change in 
quantity result from Table A1.6 falling below the level of statistical significance, the 
decrease in change for ACQUIRED HORIZONTAL ACB plants in regression [A7.3] is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Finally, in Table A1.8 I confirm the 











Table A1.8: Unweighted Pre- and Post-1982 Horizontal Merger Results 
 [8.1] [8.2] [8.3] [8.4] 
Dep. Var. PRICE PRICE TFPQ TFPQ 
ACQUIRED ALL 
0.005  0.076***  
(0.017)  (0.023)  
ACQUIRED ALL*77–82 
−0.003  −0.080**  
(0.033)  (0.034)  
ACQUIRED 
HORIZONTAL 
0.049***  0.072***  
(0.018)  (0.027)  
ACQUIRED 
HORIZONTAL*77–82 
−0.119***  −0.116***  
(0.037)  (0.044)  
R-Squared 0.412 0.417 0.569 0.567 
N 1,980 1,980 1,980 1,980 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
Regressions control for lagged TFPQ, lagged revenue, lagged capital equipment, lagged structural 
capital, lagged labor input, lagged materials input, lagged energy input, multi-unit status, age, 
change in construction employment, population density, and EA-year interactions. Standard errors 
are clustered by CEA. 
 
Again, the coefficient estimates for the change in price are smaller, the pattern 
of the results is exactly the same with all evidence of price increases and productivity 






Section A2: Appendix for Chapter 3 
 
 
Table A2.1: 10-Year Cohort from 1974 to 1983 
Fees 
High Fee Fund * (Year ≥ 1979) –47.316 
Standard Error 20.570 
P-Value 0.023 
Unconditional Average 120.972 
Rate of Return 
High Fee Fund * (Year ≥ 1979) 0.036 
Standard Error 0.033 
P-Value 0.279 
Unconditional Average 0.083 
Flow 
High Fee Fund * (Year ≥ 1979) 0.330 
Standard Error 0.351 
P-Value 0.350 
Unconditional Average 0.157 
 
Table A2.2: 12-Year Cohort from 1973 to 1984 
Fees 
High Fee Fund * (Year ≥ 1979) –32.427 
Standard Error 14.395 
P-Value 0.026 
Unconditional Average 118.057 
Rate of Return 
High Fee Fund * (Year ≥ 1979) 0.025 
Standard Error 0.026 
P-Value 0.337 
Unconditional Average 0.035 
Flow 
High Fee Fund * (Year ≥ 1979) 0.302 
Standard Error 0.281 
P-Value 0.284 
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